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Organizing the State: The “New
Labor Law” Seen from the Bottom-Up†
Michael M. Oswalt†† &
César F. Rosado Marzán†††
U.S. labor and employment law is broken. Evidence of the decay can
be gleaned from the steep decline in unions and collective bargaining,
inadequate employment protections, ineffective enforcement of many
employment laws, and correlative increases in income inequality and
unstable work. Recent scholarship has argued that out of the ashes a “new
labor law” rises, where labor, management, and state representatives share
regulatory roles for the workplace, an arrangement known as “tripartism.”
Is this wishful thinking? To find out, we report on original data
collected through an ethnographic study of inter–state (side–to–side) and
state–society (up–and–down) relationships in Chicago. We identify
pervasive and important collaborative partnerships in both arenas,
including practices that may indeed undergird a budding tripartism in the
United States. But in this nascent version, employers, the state, and unions
do not necessarily collaborate on rights enhancements and enforcement.
Rather, worker representatives contribute to the state’s primary role in
workplace regulation, and employers are nowhere to be found. Moreover,
many of the arrangements rely on the initiative and volition of unique

DOI: https://doi.org/10.15779/Z381G0HV4J
†. The authors are listed in alphabetical order and contributed equally. This article benefited
from law school faculty workshops at the University of Iowa and IIT Chicago-Kent, as well as from
commentary provided at the 2018 Annual Meeting on Law and Society. The authors also thank Martin
H. Malin, Catherine Fisk, Mihailis Diamantis, Gregory Shill, Paden Hansen, and Arise Chicago for
especially helpful assistance. The authors are extremely grateful to all of the subjects who offered their
time and expertise to help provide a fuller picture of collaboration in Chicago. The project was approved
by the Institutional Review Boards of the Illinois Institute of Technology and Northern Illinois
University. The usual disclaimers apply.
††. Associate Professor of Law, Northern Illinois University College of Law. moswalt@niu.edu.
†††. Associate Professor of Law and Co-Director, Institute for Law and Workplace, IIT ChicagoKent College of Law. University of Iowa College of Law, Visiting Professor of Law.
crosado@kentlaw.iit.edu.

415

416

BERKELEY JOURNAL OF EMPLOYMENT & LABOR LAW

Vol. 39:2

actors we call “nodal agents”—not the law. That means some of the state–
based nodal agents central to interagency and inter–civil society
collaboration derive their authority from inherently unstable political
appointments. To the extent the “new labor law” exists in Chicago, and
likely elsewhere, it is a “relational labor law” that, because it relies on
informal interpersonal dynamics, is inherently precarious.
While our contribution is descriptive and explanatory, the findings
strongly point to a need for more law, including civil service protections
and nudges or even mandates for side–to–side and up–and–down
collaboration. New enforcement agencies should also be structured as
nodal agencies, i.e., institutions with legal mandates to collaborate. Given
the relative absence of employers from most of the collaborative activities
we report—as well as from our study itself—further research should focus
on the nature of management attitudes toward tripartite arrangements and
the best ways to incentivize or compel their participation in the future.
INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................... 417
I. PERSPECTIVES ON STATE–SOCIETY RELATIONS AND THE PROMISE
OF A NEW LABOR LAW .................................................................. 423
A. The New Labor Law, Lessons from Abroad, and the
Question of Replicability ........................................................ 423
B. Collaborating “Up–and–Down:” Tripartite Experimentalism
in the U.S. ............................................................................... 428
C. Collaborating “Side–to–Side:” Combatting Administrative
Incoherence ............................................................................. 429
1. The Realities of State Disorganization................................ 430
2. “Formal” Inter–Agency Collaboration: Learning from
the Administrative Law Literature ................................... 432
3. Memoranda of Understanding ............................................ 434
4. Informal Collaborative Practices ........................................ 436
D. The Socio–Politics of “Up–and–Down” and “Side–to–Side”
Collaboration .......................................................................... 438
II. METHODS .............................................................................................. 441
III. THE CHICAGO STORY .......................................................................... 444
A. Coffees and Calls: Forging Interpersonal Commitments .......... 446
B. One–Offs ................................................................................... 451
C. On the Regular........................................................................... 456
D. Sparks of Formalization: The Many Faces of Chicago MOUs . 460
1. At the Creation: Ad Hoc and Pragmatic ............................. 461
2. Referrals .............................................................................. 461
3. Information Sharing and Cross–Training ........................... 462

2018

ORGANIZING THE STATE

417

4. Joint Investigations ............................................................. 464
5. The Special Case of Consular MOUs ................................. 465
6. Lingering Skepticism ................................................... 466
E. Tripartite Chicago? Behind the Paid Sick Leave Ordinance of
2016 ........................................................................................ 466
1. The Ordinance..................................................................... 467
2. Enactment ........................................................................... 468
IV. DISCUSSION: NODAL AGENTS AND A RELATIONAL—BUT NOT
“NEW”—LABOR LAW .................................................................... 471
V. CONCLUSION AND NEXT STEPS ............................................................ 475

INTRODUCTION
Scholars agree that labor and employment law is in a state of crisis. 1
Workplace protections are weak, under-enforced, and have failed to keep
pace with the changing economy. 2 The law’s inadequacies have been
increasingly linked to income inequality, 3 a problem that, based on the last
Presidential election, seems to have caught the public’s attention. 4 Even
academic treatments of the topic have ended up on bestseller lists.5
But if the crises are clear, what comes next is not. Deep quarrels
surround how labor and employment law should transform and how the
changes might help resolve the American inequality quandary. 6

1. Cynthia Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1527, 1530
(2002) (stating that American labor law has been rendered ineffective due to its isolation from
“democratic revision and renewal and from local experimentation and innovation”); Michel Coutu et al.,
Broken Paradigms: Labor Law in the Wake of Globalization and The Economic Crisis, 34 COMP. LAB.
L. & POL’Y J. 565, 566–568 (noting the economic determinants of labor law’s crisis); Charles Tilly,
Globalization Threatens Labor’s Rights, 47 INT’L LAB. & WORKING-CLASS HIST. 1 (1995) (arguing that
increased market globalization and the eclipse of the national state has endangered labor rights). But see
GUY DAVIDOV, A PURPOSIVE APPROACH TO LABOUR LAW 1 (2016) (arguing that labor law is
perpetually in crisis given that it has to adapt to incessant capitalist transformations).
2. David Cooper & Theresa Kroeger, Employers Steal Billions from Workers’ Paychecks Each
Year, ECONOMIC POL’Y INSTIT. 3-6 (May 10, 2017), http://www.epi.org/files/pdf/125116.pdf.
3. Bruce Western & Jake Rosenfeld, Unions, Norms, and the Rise in U.S. Wage Inequality, 76
AM. SOC. REV. 513, 532–33 (2011) (showing statistical analyses that link union decline to income
inequality); see also Kate Andrias, The New Labor Law, 126 YALE L.J. 2, 8, 73 (2016).
4. See David Lauter, Income Inequality Emerges as a Key Issue in the 2016 Presidential
Campaign, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 5, 2015, 4:00 AM).
5. Jia Lynn Yang, Here’s an Unlikely Bestseller: A 700-page Book on 21st Century Economics,
WASHINGTON
POST,
WONKBLOG,
(Apr.
22,
2014),
THE
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2014/04/22/heres-an-unlikely-bestseller-a-700-pagebook-on-21st-century-economics/?utm_term=.26ab3ca66b33.
6. The literature on how labor law should reframe itself for the twenty-first century is too vast to
summarize here, but see, e.g., Harry Arthurs, Labour Law After Labour, in THE IDEA OF LABOR LAW 13
(Guy Davidov & Brian Langille eds., 2011) (arguing that the subject of labor law, “labor,” has lost
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One particular prognosis has caught recent attention, however.
Professor Kate Andrias has argued that from the outdated system of U.S.
labor and employment law rises a “new labor law,” where labor,
management, and state representatives are providing new rights and
enforcement arrangements for workers through co– or tri–party negotiations
and relationships, a regime she calls “social bargaining.” 7 Much of this new
labor law is premised on developments spurred by so–called “alt–labor”
groups, 8 like the “Fight for $15” 9 and worker centers 10 that advocate for
employment rights absent a desire or obvious path toward traditional
collective bargaining relationships. So far the list of victories includes state
and local initiatives that have increased minimum wages far above the
federal level and provided masses of workers with paid sick time, “fair
scheduling” rules, and better “wage theft” protections. 11
Andrias’s important insight is that such initiatives hint at a turning
away from a bargaining model based on one employer and one workplace
and a turn toward something that is more explicitly political, potentially
with bigger and broader benefits. 12 In this respect the new labor law’s apex
currency, requiring an altogether new type of law that protects the economically subordinate); Hugh
Collins, Is There a Third Way in Labour Law?, in LABOUR LAW IN AN ERA OF GLOBALIZATION:
TRANSFORMATIVE PRACTICES AND POSSIBILITIES 449, 469 (Joanne Conaghan, Richard Michael Fischl
& Karl Klare eds., 2002) (arguing that there may be a “Third Way” for labor law that aims to improve
competitiveness and promote social inclusion while rejecting equality of redistributive outcomes);
DAVIDOV, supra note 1, at 119 (labor law should focus on remedying “democratic deficits” and worker
dependency); RUTH DUKES, THE LABOUR CONSTITUTION: THE ENDURING IDEA OF LABOUR LAW 1, 14–
17 (2014) (arguing for the revitalization of a “labor constitution” through the rebuilding of organized
labor); Cynthia Estlund, The Death of Labor Law?, 2 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 105 (2006) (explaining
how collective labor law in the U.S. could be salvaged through “new governance,” or a strategy that is
fundamentally contractual in nature); Cynthia Estlund, Rebuilding The Law of The Workplace in an Era
of Self-Regulation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 319, 323–24 (2005) (arguing that employment protections that
guarantee individual worker “voice” can help to ameliorate the eclipse of traditional, collective labor
law); Brian Langille, Labor Law’s Theory of Justice, in THE IDEA OF LABOUR LAW 101, 105–07, 111–
14 (Guy Davidov & Brian Langille eds., 2011) (arguing that labor law should cast aside its entire focus
on “inequality of bargaining power” as both out of date and empirically and analytically problematic and
rather seek universal liberty-enhancing norms); Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation
and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342, 388 (2004)
(arguing for a “new governance” regime that steps beyond traditional “command and control”).
7. Andrias, supra note 3, at 1–2.
8. See, e.g., Josh Eidelson, Alt-Labor, 24 AM. PROSPECT (Jan. 29, 2013),
http://prospect.org/article/alt-labor (describing “alt-labor” as “a new face of the U.S. labor movement—
an . . . array of groups organizing workers without the union label”). See also Brishen Rogers,
Libertarian Corporatism is Not an Oxymoron, 94 TEX. L. REV. 1623, 1631–32 (2016) (defining “altlabor” as those groups that aim to represent workers or their interests but that diverge from the
traditional Wagner Model).
9. Andrias, supra note 3, at 2 (internal citations omitted).
10. Id. Worker centers are “community-based mediating institutions that provide support to and
organize among communities of low-wage workers.” JANICE FINE, WORKER CENTERS: ORGANIZING
COMMUNITIES AT THE EDGE OF THE DREAM 11 (2006).
11. See infra Part I.A.
12. Id.
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seemed to come in 2015, when New York’s Governor revived a seemingly
defunct law that allowed for labor, management, and state representatives to
convene a “wage board” to study, and then authorize, a new minimum wage
level across a particular industry (in this case, fast food).13 The process
seemed remarkably close to highly regarded systems of co–negotiated
workplace benefits known as “tripartism” and seen mostly in Europe.
Skeptics argue that the new labor law is not really “new,” as its roots
appear to be planted in earlier incarnations of “ideological unionism,”
where labor committed itself to “class–wide political struggles,” as well as
the more recent “social justice unionism,” which emphasizes community
alliances. 14 Others focus on funding, suggesting that a genuine version of
U.S. “social bargaining” would still be dependent on resources siphoned
from conventional worksite bargaining—the very regime the new labor law
seeks to progressively displace. 15 Threats to basic dues collections through
expanded right–to–work laws and Supreme Court hostilities only worsen
the matter. 16 Overall, the pronouncement of a labor law revival seems to
some as, at best, too soon. At worst, things may be trending in the opposite
direction. 17
Yet, expanding the focus beyond the labor–specific literature is
instructive. Administrative law scholars, for example, note that
collaborations between and among state and civil society actors happen all
the time. Some of this work is informal, rarely makes headlines, and, as a
result, is relatively understudied, at least in law reviews. Some of it is more
formal and increasingly spotlighted in the legal literature. Moreover, in the
social sciences a few scholars have reported on a number of isolated yet
nevertheless concrete tripartite-like relationships operating in the United
States right now. While these tripartite-like arrangements do not necessarily
entail collaboration between management, labor, and the state, they do
provide labor with a “seat at the table,” an institutional role to regulate the
workplace alongside management and the state. 18 Most are local–level

13. BYRON BROWN ET AL., REPORT OF THE FAST FOOD WAGE BOARD TO THE NEW YORK STATE
COMMISSIONER
OF
LABOR
(July
31,
2015),
https://labor.ny.gov/workerprotection/laborstandards/pdfs/Fast-Food-Wage-Board-Report.pdf.
14. Marion Crain & Ken Matheny, The ‘New’ Labor Law, 126 YALE L.J. FORUM 478, 478–479
(2017), http://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/the-new-labor-regime.
15. Matthew Ginsburg, Nothing New Under the Sun: “The New Labor Law” Must Still Grapple
With the Traditional Challenges of Firm-Based Organizing and Building Self-Sustainable Worker
L.J.
FORUM
488,
489,
494
(2017),
Organizations,
126
YALE
https://www.yalelawjournal.org/pdf/GinsburgforPublication_p7opav41.pdf.
16. Id. at 495; Crain & Matheny, supra note 14, at 484.
17. Ginsburg, supra note 15, at 495; Crain & Matheny, supra note 14, at 484.
18. Janice Fine & Jennifer Gordon, Strengthening Labor Standards Enforcement Through
Partnerships with Workers’ Organizations, 38 POL. & SOC’Y 552, 553, 577 n.4 (2010). Fine and Gordon
use Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite’s definition of “tripartism.” As Fine and Gordon state:
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initiatives that have received little sustained attention but provide genuine
glimpses of how state, labor, and management can effectively co-regulate
the workplace.
Our project springs from these relevant but relatively inconspicuous
realities. We seek to examine the empirical nuts and bolts of labor and
employment law–related partnerships both between the state and civil
society, (which we call “up–and–down” collaboration) and among public
enforcement agencies (which we denote “side–to–side”). Both collaborative
types can bolster labor and employment law protections. Through meetings,
workshops, conferences, and trainings, up–and–down activities promote
information exchange, relationships, and legal strategies that may lead to
new rights or better use of existing protections. When administrators work
side–to–side, they heal structural incoherencies that infect workplace law,
especially enforcement regimes tied to a diversity of statutes and fissured
across a multiplicity of city, state, and federal agencies. 19
On another, more theoretically important level, up–and–down and
side–to–side collaborations can form the social organization from which
tripartism may flourish or fail. If the new labor law entails labor,
management, and government all working together in a formal way, or at
least taking on more definite regulatory roles, how well the parties are
doing that now informally may be the barometer necessary to get a handle
on the regime’s potential and staying power in the future.
The base for our empirical work was Chicago, in part because we both
live and work in the metropolitan region, so it was a convenient location for
sustained study. But beyond expedience, Chicago seemed like the ideal
counterpart to New York, where most of the developments suggesting the
arrival of a “new labor law” have occurred. Like New York, Chicago is a
big, blue city in a big, blue state and the setting for a confluence of city,
state, and federal administrative offices. It is also home to a number of large
The traditional understanding of tripartism is labor, business, and government working
together. Here we are referring to a specific proposal for a republican form of tripartism put
forward by Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite in Responsive Regulation. Their idea of tripartism
is a process in which relevant public interest groups (PIGs) become what they refer to as ‘fully
fledged third player[s]’ in the game of regulation. Tripartism allows PIGs to participate in
three ways: (1) it grants them and their members access to all the information that the
regulator has, (2) it gives the PIG a seat at the negotiating table with the firm and agency when
deals are done, and (3) PIGs are granted the same standing to sue or prosecute under the
regulatory statute as the regulator. Id. (citing IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE
REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE 56–60 (1992)).
19. Matthew W. Finkin, NAFTA/NAALC and Member Countries, United States, in
INTERNATIONAL LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAWS, 33a-2 (William L. Keller et al. eds., 3d ed. 2008)
(describing U.S. labor and employment law as a tapestry of isolated statutes historically created to
resolve labor problems as they surfaced); ANDREW SCHRANK & MICHAEL PIORE, ECONOMIC COMM’N
FOR LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN, SERIE ESTUDIOS Y PERSPECTIVAS: NORMS, REGULATIONS
AND LABOR STANDARDS IN CENTRAL AMERICA, at 14, U.N. Doc. 77, U.N. Sales No. E.07.II.G.44
(2007) (contrasting “inflexible,” “bureaucratic,” and narrowly jurisdictional Anglo-American labor and
employment law enforcement systems with flexible, generalist, and unified Latin American models).

2018

ORGANIZING THE STATE

421

employers, associations of employers, local unions, and an especially
vibrant “alt–labor” movement, including nearly a dozen worker centers and
one of the original Fight for $15 contingents. 20
The research itself had two components. First, one of us spent
approximately 18–months as a participant–observer at a Chicago worker
center. 21 Second, over seven months in 2017, both of us interviewed
eighteen elite subjects representing a cross–section of federal, state, and
local labor and employment law–related agencies, prominent city worker
centers, and major labor unions. 22
Our results have notes of optimism but also caution. Despite the
nation’s radically decentralized system of labor and employment law,
collaboration—genuine, committed, productive partnerships—persists both
side–to–side and up–and–down. The impact is significant enough to suggest
that some of the social infrastructure required for tripartism exists, though it
is uneven and lacking in employer participation and true collaborative
spirit. Much of this finding is grounded in the presence of exceptional
actors we label “nodal agents” for their relationally connective practices and
strong commitment to working across administrative and civil society
boundaries to enforce rights. In a quite literal sense, these actors are nodes
for sharing information, building social capital, and networking with
advocates and officials alike throughout the city. In essence, nodal agents
organize state institutions—administrative agencies, federal, state, and
local—by bringing them closer together to better enforce labor rights in
Chicago.
Unfortunately, we also discovered that not all nodal agents are created
equally. Some lack civil service protections and are subject to changing
political winds. As repeatedly described to us first–hand, a new
administration can mean a prompt exit and the end to a fruitful partnership.
While replacement officials may prove to have similar characteristics, trust
takes time, and it appears at least equally likely that a new administrator
will be non–nodal or lacking in collaborative commitments. We call these
authorities “islets” for their tendency to work alone, entrenched in their
assigned agency offices and clinging to a narrow view of their enforcement
and jurisdictional obligations.
These primary findings lead us to contend not only that how nodes and
islets combine to enhance or block networks among agencies and groups
informs collaboration in Chicago, but that the city’s collaborative culture
overall depends greatly on the permanence or impermanence of their
positions. In other words, an islet with strong civil service protections can
20.

Michael M. Oswalt, Improvisational Unionism, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 597, 623 (2016).
See infra Part II.
22. As discussed infra, our attempts to interview employer representatives were either
unsuccessful or formally declined.
21.
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be a continuous block, while a node without those protections can be a
boon—but possibly only for a bit.
Thus, our ultimate suggestions turn on the need for more law to better
protect and secure the positions of nodal agents, while at the same time
promoting or requiring collaboration where possible to motivate or mandate
islets into action. The latter process is likely to be naturally assisted by
community groups and activists who prioritize “organizing” public officials
into productive interagency and inter–society relationships. The combined
efforts of civil society and state nodal agents, enhanced by laws that
mandate collaboration and protect tenure, can help to “organize” the
nation’s decentralized and even incoherent state.
As for the state of “new labor law” in Chicago today, our work
indicates that it is premature to claim that something like the regime is here
or, frankly, on the horizon. The collaborations we found were easily
identified, inspiring, and sometimes profound—but also largely informal
and always precarious. Simply put, a weekend workshop that brings
together all sides, prompts new empathies, and even leads to new cross–
party collaborative mechanisms is still not the same as a wage board.
Informal, non–mandated get–togethers can be as inconspicuous as they are
fleeting.
So, in the absence of tripartism or other formalized structures, and in a
political climate that is often hostile to labor rights, our hope is to formalize
what appears to be a relational labor law. We want to buttress civil service
protections and promote collaboration in ways that rationalize
administrative activity and bring more coherence to our otherwise fissured
state. We advocate, in other words, for laws and practices that help organize
the state. To offer a simple example, Chicago activists and agency officials
are currently working on the creation of a “universal complaint form” that
would allow a worker to file a single document with any city, state, or
federal agency, no matter the alleged legal violation. While the effort is not
necessarily unprecedented nor evidence of an emergent “new labor law,” it
is an important collaborative advance that helps to organize the state agents
responsible for guarding workers’ rights. A better organized state can also
help to consolidate worker organizations into civil society regulatory actors,
giving them better defined roles and authority over workplace issues.
This article proceeds as follows. Part I surveys existing discussions
regarding
state–society
collaboration,
tripartism,
tripartite-like
arrangements, and workers’ rights. The literature points to empirical gaps in
legal scholarship’s understanding of informal administrative activities,
something we seek to remedy in Part II, which describes our research
methods, and in Part III, which details our results. Part III separates our
findings into five categories of increasing collaborative formality: (1)
highly casual “coffees and calls”; (2) planned “one–off” or finite joint
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projects between and among agencies and advocates; (3) “regularized” or
stable collaborative initiatives; (4) inter–agency and agency–consulate
memoranda of understandings; and (5) a quasi–tripartite fact–finding and
deliberative process that resulted in the 2016 Chicago Paid Sick Leave
Ordinance. Part IV analyzes these results and develops a “two–by–two”
matrix detailing how a “relational labor law” operates in Chicago. The work
is importantly propelled by state actors we call “nodal agents,” who push
collaboration against a backdrop of officials with characteristics that
sometimes inhibit it, known as “islets.” As we discuss, whether these
players are “permanent” or “temporary” fixtures of the landscape is a
critical factor in the makeup of the Chicago’s collaborative culture overall.
The article concludes with suggestions for further steps, mostly at the level
of research, to bolster these and other partnerships in the future.
I. PERSPECTIVES ON STATE–SOCIETY RELATIONS AND THE PROMISE OF A
NEW LABOR LAW
Of the many ways labor and employment law might be improved,
proposals that promote the centralization of organizing, bargaining, and
enforcement are some of the most promising. They are also increasingly
linked to mechanisms that allow for multi–party negotiations or even
partnerships. 23 As explained below, while formal examples of such projects
are few and far between, social science and administrative law scholarship
suggests that the spread of something similar—if significantly more
informal—is possible, but only with the right mix of collaborative practices,
political dynamics, and personal relationships between and among
administrative and civil society actors.
A. The New Labor Law, Lessons from Abroad, and the Question of
Replicability
In a recent article, Professor Kate Andrias identified the gradual birth
of a “new labor law,” based on a conception of bargaining untethered to a
single workplace and much broader than the “privatized, firm–based
collective bargaining with exclusive representation that has defined
American labor relations since the New Deal.” 24 That New Deal model
developed out of the Wagner Act of 1935, 25 the Taft–Hartley Act of 1947, 26
23. See, e.g., MARK BARENBERG, ROOSEVELT INST., WIDENING THE SCOPE OF WORKER
ORGANIZING: LEGAL REFORMS TO FACILITATE MULTI-EMPLOYER ORGANIZING, BARGAINING, AND
STRIKING (2015), http://rooseveltinstitute.org/widening-scope-worker-organizing/ (describing the
difficulty of organizing and bargaining “across entire contractual supply chains, networks, industries,
occupations, or regions” and proposing “four large-scale reforms to . . . actively facilitate” engagement
“across multiple employers”).
24. Andrias, supra note 3, at 2, 8, 73.
25. Wagner Act, Pub. L. No. 198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2012)).
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and other more limited amendments that make up the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA or Act), the primary statute governing labor relations
in the private sector. At heart, Andrias depicts the new labor law as a
resurgence of a system of governance where some combination of
representatives from management, labor, and the state bargain over
workplace related matters. 27 Fully realized, it could displace—or at least
exist alongside—the NLRA’s “commitment to the employer–employee
dyad,” through sectoral, industrial, regional or even national bargaining
between the parties. 28 By including the state as a likely central player in that
process, the new labor law deemphasizes the role of workplace private
ordering, 29 a central strand in mainstream judicial interpretations of the
NRLA. 30 While the new labor law may not totally eclipse plant–level
employee representation, it might compel other organizational forms
beyond the exclusive representation model given prominence under the
NLRA. 31
Andrias develops her prognosis for the new labor law’s development
mostly by examining the experiences of the “alt–labor” campaigns
spearheaded by “Organization United for Respect at Walmart (OUR
Walmart)” and “Fast Food Forward” and its current incarnation, the “Fight
for $15,” in the last half–decade or so. 32 These efforts have ignited state and
local political processes across the country that, most concretely, have led
to the resetting of minimum wages far above the federal level. 33 Some
public institutions, such as the University of California and the federal
government’s contracting arm, have matched these increases, and even
notoriously low–wage companies like Walmart and McDonald’s have
boosted minimums, albeit not to $15 an hour. 34 Most recently the
momentum has carried over to the issue of workplace scheduling, and a

26.

Id. §§ 141–197.
Andrias, supra note 3, at 10 (citing Nelson Lichtenstein, The Demise of Tripartite
Governance and the Rise of the Corporate Social Responsibility Regime, in ACHIEVING WORKERS’
RIGHTS IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 95 (Richard Appelbaum & Nelson Lichtenstein eds., 2016)
28. Andrias, supra note 3, at 58.
29. Id.
30. See, e.g., Karl Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern
Legal Consciousness, 1937–1941, 62 MINN. L. REV. 265, 293 (1977) (describing a contractualist
reading of the NLRA by the courts).
31. Id. at 81, 99 (stating that members-only unions, works councils, and employee-owned firms
may supplement even social bargaining under the new labor law).
32. Andrias, supra note 3, at 47.
33. Id. at 51–57. For a summary of state and local minimum wage increases since the start of
OUR Walmart and Fight for $15 in 2012, see NAT’L EMP’T LAW PROJECT, FIGHT FOR $15, FOUR
YEARS, $62 BILLION (Dec. 2016) (“Of the $61.5 billion in additional [annual] income, 66% is the result
of landmark $15 minimum wage laws that Fight for $15 won in California, New York, Los Angeles, San
Francisco, Seattle, SeaTac and Washington D.C. over the past few years.”).
34. Id.
27.
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number of local governments and firms have agreed to enact rules to
enhance predictability and notice. 35
Andrias’s key turn is to suggest that out of these mobilizations, a new
type of labor organization, one with the goal to engage in tripartism or
“social bargaining” that would benefit all workers—union members or
not—is surfacing. 36 In support, she highlights how “$15 and a union” has
become not simply a rallying cry but the base for an aspirational model of
representation across all of low–wage work. 37 Fight for $15’s activism
against McDonald’s, additionally, has aimed at something like sectoral, or
industry–wide bargaining by showing how McDonald’s Corporation
controls or has the right to control the terms and conditions of its
franchisees’ employees, raising its potential status as a “joint employer”
that could be compelled to negotiate with unions trying to organize its
otherwise independent restaurants. 38 Attempts at such sectoral bargaining,
or, perhaps, quasi–sectoral bargaining, as McDonald’s is only one firm, are
notably coupled with state–directed demands to pass laws to improve
conditions for all workers. 39 As Andreas recounts:
From these fledgling and evolving efforts, one can derive a glimmer of
tripartism in labor relations largely abandoned since the New Deal: triangle
bargaining among workers, employers, and the state over wages and
benefits. The recent experience with the New York Wage Board provides
the most concrete example. On May 6, 2015, after growing protests and
strikes in New York organized by the Fight for $15, Governor Andrew
Cuomo announced that he would take executive action to raise wages. As
Cuomo explained, New York State law permitted the labor commissioner to
investigate whether wages paid in a specific industry or job classification
are sufficient to provide for the life and health of those workers, and, if not,
to impanel a wage board to recommend what adequate wages should be.
Invoking Franklin Roosevelt’s aggressive use of executive power against
moneyed interests, Cuomo directed the Commissioner to exercise such
authority. The next day, New York’s Acting Commissioner for Labor
issued a memorandum providing data to show that “a substantial number of
fast–food workers in the hospitality industry are receiving wages
insufficient to provide adequate maintenance and to protect their health”
and began the wage board process. 40

Andrias connects these developments to the truth that centralized—as
opposed to firm–based—bargaining is generally more effective for both

35. Id. See also Justin Miller, In $15’s Wake, Fair Scheduling Gains Momentum, AM. PROSPECT
(Sept. 20, 2016), http://prospect.org/article/15-wake-fair-scheduling-gains-momentum.
36. Andrias, supra note 3, at 8.
37. Id. at 49.
38. Id. at 58.
39. Id. at 64–65.
40. Id.
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worker organization and the creation of egalitarian redistributive policies
that sustain a middle class. 41 Commonly known as “tripartism,”
“corporatism,” 42 or simply centralized bargaining, 43 evidence supporting
the arrangement’s impact on organized labor is abundant. Professor Matt
Dimick has summarized how centralization helps unions by reducing
employer opposition, incentivizing investments in physical and human
capital through infrastructure and skill–building, and compressing wage
spreads, reducing income inequality overall while also benefitting the
macro–economy. 44 The effects hold even given the challenges of
globalization. In a seminal study, sociologist Bruce Western showed how
centralization had a positive effect on union membership despite the
arrangement’s insertion into global markets that generally weaken
collective bargaining institutions.45
Although centralized bargaining, like the wage boards board in New
York, may start as a way to set wages across an industry, the gains don’t
necessarily stop there. Latin American industrial relations and legal scholars
have shown, for instance, that Uruguayan wage committees, established by
law but convened exclusively by the country’s presidents at their discretion,
have also helped to promote negotiation on an array of subjects while
increasing union density in the process. 46 As the Uruguayan experience
proves, wages inexorably relate to other terms and conditions of

41. See BRUCE WESTERN, BETWEEN CLASS AND MARKET 135, 192 (1997) (describing how
centralized collective bargaining supports high levels of union density while decentralization erodes it);
Matthew Dimick, Productive Unionism, 4 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 679, 696–98 (2013) (explaining how
labor market centralization encourages unionism by dis-incentivizing employer opposition and
encouraging investments in human capital, lowering income inequality overall).
42. See Philippe C. Schmitter, Still the Century of Corporatism?, 36 REV. POL. 85, 86 (describing
corporatism as “a particular modal or ideal-typical institutional arrangement for linking the
associationally organized interests of civil society with the decisional structures of the state”); Michael
L. Wachter, Labor Unions: A Corporatist Institution in a Competitive World, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 581,
589–91 (2007) (describing corporatism as a system of interest representation that enfranchises
individuals and organizations, creates incentives for cooperative relationships between those organized
interests and the state, sets boundaries on which individuals and groups can participate, and expects that
groups discipline their internal constituents). See also Brishen Rogers, Libertarian Corporatism is Not
an Oxymoron, 94 TEX. L. REV. 1623, 1624–25, 1637, 1640–41 (proposing a model of “libertarian
corporatism” for contemporary U.S. society where individuals can select whichever bargaining
representative they prefer, doing away with exclusive representation while also eliminating restrictions
on unions’ concerted activities, including those related to secondary targets).
43. See WESTERN, supra note 41, at 8.
44. Dimick, supra note 41, at 695–702.
45. WESTERN, supra note 41, at 191–92 (detailing how countries that retained centralized
collective bargaining, such as Finland, were also able to maintain high levels of unionization while labor
market decentralization contributed to union decline amidst globalization).
46. HÉCTOR-HUGO BARBAGELATA ET AL., EL CONTENIDO DE LOS CONVENIOS COLECTIVOS
(1998); SERGIO GAMONAL CONTRERAS, DERECHO COLECTIVO DEL TRABAJO 34 (2d ed. 2011) (citing
ÓSCAR ERMIDA URIARTE, INTRODUCCIÓN, CUARENTA ESTUDIOS SOBRE LA NUEVA LEGISLACIÓN
LABORAL URUGUAYA 8 (2010)).
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employment, 47 and since workers recognize that increased union
membership means more organized power to deliver the goods, the
committees also encourage unionization itself. 48
One of us has also shown that during the heyday of Puerto Rico’s
experiment with export–led industrialization in the 1950s, union–catalyzed
tripartite committees raised wages but also added benefits in the garment
sector. 49 At the time, the Puerto Rican garment trade was considered a
“runaway industry” by U.S. unions for its on–going relocations from high
wage, organized areas of the mainland east coast to the lower wage,
unorganized island. 50 Given the open border relationship between the
United States and the territory, manufacturers could move to Puerto Rico
with ease. 51 But so could American unions. Organized labor followed
industry to the Caribbean island, compelled the government to assertively
use wage committee laws that included unions, and advocated for raising
wages just cents below what the committees assessed were the maximum
wages that the industry could support. 52 The unions then used their
knowledge of management’s capacity to pay slightly higher wages—
attained through the wage committees—to negotiate marginal benefits
exclusively via collective bargaining, including, importantly, health care.53
In all, the combination of sectoral bargaining for wages and firm–based
bargaining for marginal benefits buttressed the need for unions at both
central and plant levels, 54 enabling unions to significantly grow in what had
previously been understood in Puerto Rico to be an un–organizable sector. 55
Despite the promise of centralized bargaining and Andrias’ careful
study and hopeful analysis of recent events, important replicability
questions remain. 56 Andrias herself is cautious. While Fight for $15 is
active in many states, only three others—California (Sacramento),

47.

BARBAGELATA ET AL., supra note 46.
GAMONAL CONTRERAS, supra note 46, at 34.
49. César F. Rosado Marzán, Successful Wage Moderation: Trust, Labor Market Centralization,
and Wage Moderation in Puerto Rico’s Experience With Export-Led Development, 9 ELECTRONIC J.
COMP. L. 1, 17 (2005).
50. Id. at 14.
51. Id. at 17.
52. Id.
53. Id.; See also Cesar F. Rosado Marzán, Dependent Unionism: Resource Mobilization and
Union Density in Puerto Rico 71 (Apr. 11, 2005) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University)
(on file with author) (explaining how the garment worker unions in Puerto Rico bargained for marginal
benefits after negotiating wages through committees).
54. Rosado Marzán, supra note 49, at 17.
55. Id.
56. See, e.g., Max Zahn, Can the Fight for $15 Replicate Its New York Wage Board Victory
THESE
TIMES
(Oct.
15,
2015,
3:28
PM),
Around
the
Country?,
IN
http://inthesetimes.com/working/entry/18516/fight-for-15-wage-board-minimum-wage (describing the
Fight for $15’s aspiration to “set up wage boards everywhere in the country”).
48.
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Washington State (Tacoma and Seattle), and Illinois (Chicago)—appear to
have convened something like a tripartite entity of sorts. 57 Even these
bodies are closer to informal or ad hoc commissions than the model
successfully implemented in New York. 58 When activists planned so–called
“People’s Wage Board” hearings around the country in 2015 to generate
momentum for further legislation, proponents admitted the strategy’s
success is highly contingent on variable political dynamics. 59
B. Collaborating “Up–and–Down:” Tripartite Experimentalism in the U.S.
Another way to dig into the promise of tripartism is to look below the
surface of wage boards, toward more micro, local experiments. Here, the
theme emerging from empirical analyses is that tripartite projects are
valuable but highly exceptional. 60 Professors Janice Fine and Jennifer
Gordon have been among the scholars who have provided the most detail
through examinations of a number of tripartite-like arrangements where
labor minimally has a role regulating the workplace, alongside the state and
employers. 61 These tripartite-like arrangements include state–labor
partnerships—what we call “up–and–down” collaboration—ranging from
the durable and stable to the contingent and fragile. 62 The strongest case
involves the Los Angeles Unified School District (LAUSD) and Board of
Public Works Deputization Programs, where LAUSD trains and deputizes
local trade union staffers to inspect public school construction sites,
including non-union contractors, for violations of prevailing wage laws.
The program thrives, according to Fine and Gordon, because it provides
formal, legal mechanisms for collaboration between state and worker
representatives to regulate the workplace. 63 Employers respect the deputized
union inspectors because city law requires it, and unions voluntarily get
57.

Andrias, supra note 3, at 66.
Id. at 66–67.
59. Zahn, supra note 56.
60. See, e.g., Janice Fine & Jennifer Gordon, Strengthening Labor Standards Enforcement
Through Partnerships with Workers’ Organizations, 38 POL. & SOC’Y 552, 558–60 (2010) (describing
how existing tripartism examples have “been ad hoc rather than rooted in policy”); Janice Fine, Solving
the Problem from Hell: Tripartism as a Strategy for Addressing Labour Standards Non-Compliance in
the United States, 50 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 813, 840–842 (2013) (discussing the patchy U.S. history with
tripartism, giving extraordinary contemporary examples, and describing the likely importance of formal
law to institutionalize tripartism going forward).
61. Fine & Gordon, supra note 60, at 553, 553 n.4.
62. Id. at 563–71. We do not report on the third case dealing with the New York Wage and Hour
Watch because, according to the authors, the program was in the design stage at the time of their reports.
Id. at 569.
63. Id. at 564–65. See also LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT FACILITIES SERVICES
DIVISION, JOINT COMPLIANCE MONITORING PROGRAM LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT &
ALL WORK PRESERVATION GROUPS: RULES OF ENGAGEMENT (FISCAL YEAR 2017–18),
http://www.laschools.org/contractor/lc/documents/download/workpreservation/Rules_of_Engagement.pdf (last visited July 31, 2018).
58.
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involved “because their incentives are closely aligned with the” program’s
goals. 64
In another illustration, Fine and Gordon highlight that formal law is not
necessarily a prerequisite for effective state–labor collaboration. Trust can
sometimes substitute. In California, the state–run Labor Commission
Janitorial Enforcement Team (JET), which enforces laws relating to the
capitalization of janitorial service companies, teams up with the
Maintenance Cooperation Trust Fund (MCTF), a union–backed watchdog,
to bring noncompliant businesses to the state’s attention. The partnership
works because MCTF has won JET’s confidence by providing quality
evidence on noncompliant employers over time, greatly enhancing JET’s
otherwise limited enforcement capabilities. 65
Fine’s and Gordon’s work and related studies show that synergies
between state and civil society actors—namely unions—to enforce labor
and employment laws are possible. But advocates’ push for further
diffusion and formalization of like partnerships comes with the caveat that
the law–backed track record is thin, 66 and that all efforts require political
and relational commitments that are difficult to cultivate and sustain over
time. 67 Most obviously, the arrangements above are tripartite not in the
collaborative way the new labor law envisions, but in a narrower sense,
where labor plays at least a minimal regulatory role. 68 Other challenges
include that state participants may eventually express “resentment” toward
the labor groups. In a California case, some officials viewed the
arrangement as impinging on their “neutrality” while enabling an
inappropriate culture of activism toward employers. 69 Employee
organizations, for their part, lamented their loss of control over cases
referred to the agency and cited interpersonal frictions with the officers. 70
C. Collaborating “Side–to–Side:” Combatting Administrative Incoherence
Beyond some of the successful examples of up-and-down cooperation
is the issue of whether government can generally be viewed as a reliable
partner. A union, worker center, or other advocacy group primed to work
with an agency may find that the actors best suited to represent the state are
embedded in a system of structural disorganization, isolation, or disinterest,
64.

Fine & Gordon, supra note 60, at 565.
Id. at 568.
66. Id. at 561.
67. Matthew Amengual & Janice Fine, Co-enforcing Labor Standards: The Unique Contributions
of State and Worker Organizations in Argentina and the United States, 11 REG. & GOVERNANCE 1, 9
(2016).
68. Fine & Gordon, supra note 60, at 553, 553 n.4.
69. Amengual & Fine, supra note 67, at 7–9.
70. Id.
65.
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stopping collaboration in its tracks. While research suggests that this is
often the case, a range of tools and practices can help facilitate “side-toside” or lateral administrative relationships. As described below, these
range from formal mechanisms, like committees and written agreements, to
informal activities, like repeated personal contacts.
1. The Realities of State Disorganization
It is well established that state bodies organized as bureaucracies
develop internal organizational logics that decouple administrators from
broad policy goals. Early on, sociologist Max Weber noted how
bureaucracies have a tendency to protect “office secrets” and hoard power
to safeguard internal authority. 71 Sociologist Vivek Chibber, who performed
one of the most celebrated studies on state incoherence and effective public
policy, has shown the need for so–called “nodal agencies” to stir necessarily
disparate and autonomous state bodies and bureaucrats in specific, national
directions. 72 In his study, focused on economic development in India and
South Korea, Chibber explained how the Indian post–colonial state was
unable to deliver on its promise to develop the Indian economy despite
strong policy pronouncements, while South Korea, by many measurable
ways less developed than India, transformed into a developmental
powerhouse. 73 In both cases, the causative factors at play were complex, but
India suffered from a particular weakness that made it impossible to
implement favored development policies: the state was bureaucratically
incoherent and thus incapable of “disciplining” the Indian capitalist class. 74
The capitalist class wanted the Indian state to intervene and even “plan,”
but only in its interest through subsidies, credit, and procurement
contracts. 75 These elite actors did not want to be disciplined or coerced by
the state in service to a particular path of national development, and
ultimately the Indian state succumbed to those pressures. 76 The South
Korean state, on the other hand, was united. The Korean Economic
Planning Board, acting as what Chibber describes as a “nodal agency”
promoting order and integrity to the state’s economic development efforts,
“disciplined” capitalists who opposed the centralized schemes. 77 Forced by
the Korean Economic Planning Board to innovate, South Korea

71. MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY: AN OUTLINE OF INTERPRETIVE SOCIOLOGY 992
(Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., Ephraim Fischoff et al. trans., Univ. of Cal. Press 1978) (1922).
72. VIVEK CHIBBER, LOCKED IN PLACE: STATE-BUILDING AND LATE INDUSTRIALIZATION IN
INDIA (2004).
73. Id. at 1–5.
74. Id. at 7.
75. Id. at 147.
76. Id. at 147, 154–55.
77. Id. at 21.
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successfully outperformed many global competitors, driving much of the
nation’s developmental success story. 78
In many ways, the U.S. labor and employment law administrative
landscape is closer to India’s than South Korea’s. Developed “piecemeal”
over decades, relevant policies are scattered across and within state and
federal agencies, often overlap, sometimes conflict, and rarely coordinate. 79
The system defies accessible organizing principles 80 and can force
advocates to scrutinize procedures, practices, forums, and remedies as
carefully as the merits of an overarching goal. 81 Sociologist Shannon
Gleeson has revealed some practical effects of this incoherence, where
agencies tasked with enforcing laws intimately related to workers’ rights,
like the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC), and Department of Labor (DOL), focus
mostly on meeting narrow duties to administer their charged statutes and
seldom meaningfully collaborate or coordinate activities across agencies. 82
The problem persists despite obvious mandate overlaps and even in the
context of low–wage workers, who are most likely to experience a
multiplicity of labor and employment law violations. 83 It can be particularly
acute where workplace protections and immigration law intersect,
exemplified by the infamous actions of federal Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) agents who dressed up like Occupational Safety and
Health Administration (OSHA) officials to question, process, and deport

78.

Id. at 21, 156.
Craig Becker, Thoughts on the Unification of U.S. Labor and Employment Law: Is the Whole
Greater than the Sum of the Parts?, 35 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 161, 165–67 (2017). The federal
Department of Labor alone is responsible for 180 statutes with nearly two-dozen separate enforcement
procedures. Id. at 165. See also Clyde Summers, Effective Remedies for Employment Rights:
Preliminary Guidelines and Proposals, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 457, 529–30 (1992) (“The jumble of
procedures and remedies for individual employment rights lacks any coherent pattern.”).
80. As 1994’s federal “Dunlop Commission”—tasked with studying the legal framework
underlying worker-management relations—concluded, the “whole field has become far too large and
complex” even “for independent researchers.” COMM’N ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER–MGMT.
RELATIONS, U.S. DEPT’S OF LAB. & COM., FINAL REPORT 71 (1994) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT]. See
also Summers, supra note 79, at 530–31 (“The diversity is . . . without defensible reason.”).
81. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 80, at 84 (describing enforcement “disputes rooted in the
administration of the law rather than the merits of a case”). The Dunlop Commission’s fact-finding
underscored this reality to sardonic effect, using a consciously convoluted narrative and chart to “offer[]
a glimpse of the array of forums, procedures, and remedies available under this country’s law of the
workplace.” Id. at 111, 132.
82. SHANNON GLEESON, CONFLICTING COMMITMENTS: THE POLITICS OF ENFORCING
IMMIGRANT WORKER RIGHTS IN SAN JOSE AND HOUSTON 57–59 (2012) (describing how state agencies
that enforce labor and employment rights exist as “bureaucratic islands”). See also Amengual & Fine,
supra note 67, at 2 (“In the U.S., there is rich history of independent regulatory agencies that has
evolved into an organizational culture that views collaboration in [work law] enforcement as
anathema.”).
83. Id.; SHANNON GLEESON, PRECARIOUS CLAIMS: THE PROMISE AND FAILURE OF WORKPLACE
PROTECTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 132–33 (2016).
79.
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undocumented workers who showed up to take part in a safety “training.” 84
Gleeson underscores the point that OSHA staff had a hard time establishing
trust after that event. 85
2. “Formal” Inter–Agency Collaboration: Learning from the
Administrative Law Literature
The complexities of lateral relations have also been broadly discussed
by administrative law scholars, who call “interagency coordination . . . one
of the central challenges of modern governance,” with jurisdictional
overlap, function sharing, dual–enforcement, and other legal
“redundanc[ies]” affecting all levels of government. 86 The situation is
“inevitable, pervasive, and stubborn.” 87
Why and how these sorts of puzzles arose is subject to debate, with
explanations ranging from the deliberate (to promote interagency
competition, monitoring, or know–how), to the structural (a consequence of
contentious and authority–seeking legislative committee systems), to the
purely “accidental” (the natural result of incremental delegations over
time). 88 Whatever the reason, a consensus position89 is that today’s complex
policy problems require agencies to rise above fragmentation by sharing
information, expertise, and best practices to maximize productivity,
minimize costs, and avoid “turf battles” that stymie good government. 90
That is, they need to work together. 91 In Weberian terms, agencies need to
84.

GLEESON, CONFLICTING COMMITMENTS, supra note 82, at 80–81.
Id.
86. Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space, 125 HARV. L.
REV. 1131, 1134 (2012).
87. Id. at 1136.
88. Id. at 1138–45.
89. See, e.g., FREDERICK M. KAISER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41803, INTERAGENCY
COLLABORATIVE ARRANGEMENTS AND ACTIVITIES: TYPES, RATIONALES, CONSIDERATIONS 15 (2011)
[hereinafter CRS INTERAGENCY REPORT] (citing “clarion calls for improved collaboration, coordination,
or clarification of functions and duties—along with other ways to enhance cooperation—among
agencies with shared responsibilities and overlapping jurisdictions”).
90. Id. at 15–21 (noting also that “[r]ationales for interagency collaboration are multiple in
number and dimensions” and that some “lend themselves to subcategories, differ in importance and
currency, or overlap with and reinforce others”). See also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-121022, MANAGING FOR RESULTS: KEY CONSIDERATIONS FOR IMPLEMENTING INTERAGENCY
COLLABORATIVE MECHANISMS 1 (2012) [hereinafter GAO INTERAGENCY REPORT] (“We have reported
about the importance of collaboration between federal agencies for many years. For example, we have
noted that interagency mechanisms . . . may reduce potentially duplicative, overlapping, and fragmented
efforts.”).
91. Professor Jason Marisam paints the big picture: “In our complex regulatory system, in which
many regulatory problems implicate multiple agencies’ expertise and interests, agencies cannot afford to
focus on their own tasks to the exclusion of other agencies’ agendas. Such inward-looking agencies may
produce actions that achieve some core objectives. But they will miss opportunities to advance their
interests through the thousands of actions taken by other agencies, and they will fail to protect their
interests from negative side effects generated by other agencies’ actions. Thus, rational agencies today
85.
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stop hoarding “office secrets” and substantially promote the policies they
have been mandated to foster.
Legal academics suggest that agencies are making advances on this
front. 92 A robust literature has emerged to track this progress, much of it
zeroing–in on how the work gets done. 93 Simply classifying the immense
array of ways one agency might interact with another agency has spawned a
variety of descriptors, but the most inclusive heading tends to be
“collaboration,” generally defined as “any joint activity that is intended to
produce more public value than could be produced when the agencies act
alone.” 94 The devices agencies use to collaborate are also subject to
categorization, most broadly whether the practice is “formal” or
“informal.” 95
Greatest attention has been paid to the formal side, meaning lateral
relations compelled by law, an administrative or executive rule, or at least
an expectation memorialized in an agreement. 96 Professors Jody Freeman
and Jim Rossi have provided perhaps the most comprehensive accounting
of the major examples at the federal level, including numerous statutes and
orders that mandate or merely recommend interagency consultations or
rulemaking; high–profile White House initiatives that create czars, task
forces, or councils to orchestrate and oversee cross–agency relations; and

constantly seek to influence other agencies’ actions to advance and protect their own interests.” Jason
Marisam, Interagency Administration, 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 183, 188 (2013).
92. See Richard C. Feiock & John T. Scholz, Self-Organizing Governance of Institutional
Collective Action Dilemmas: An Overview, in SELF-ORGANIZING FEDERALISM 3 (Richard C. Feiock &
John T. Scholz eds., 2010) (“In our complex, interconnected, and information-dense world, policy
problems increasingly transcend the jurisdictional boundaries of governments and their specialized
agencies at all levels. Examples abound of agencies working across jurisdictions, across levels of
government, across agencies, and across sectors.”); CRS INTERAGENCY REPORT, supra note 89, at 1
(“Interagency coordinative arrangements and activities . . . appear to be growing in number, prominence,
and proposals throughout virtually all individual policy areas and across-the-board.”).
93. See, e.g., Keith Bradley, The Design of Agency Interactions, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 745, 748–
54 (2011); Freeman & Rossi, supra note 86, at 1134–38; Marisam, supra note 91, at 188–89; David A.
Hyman & William E. Kovacic, Why Who Does What Matters: Governmental Design and Agency
Performance, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1446, 1447–51 (2014); Yoon-Ho Alex Lee, Beyond Agency Core
Mission, 68 ADMIN. L. REV. 551, 581–83 (2016).
94. GAO INTERAGENCY REPORT, supra note 90, at 3. The Government Accountability Office
settled on the umbrella term after concluding it was “unable to make definitive distinctions between”
other common descriptors of interagency relations. CRS INTERAGENCY REPORT, supra note 89, at 2. See
also id. at Summary (noting that types of interagency relations are “not defined” in law and have “lacked
consistency and precision, have been used interchangeably, or have been applied to more than one
category”). To the extent sub-types of collaboration can be reliably identified (an open question), they
often include coordination, integration, partnering, merging, and networking. Id. at 3–4. “Coordination,”
for example, is considered a “top-down” form of collaboration initiated, monitored, and controlled by a
“lead authority.” Id. at 6. Even there, however, the line between directed coordination and other more
voluntary collaborative practices is, in practice, elusive. Id. at 11–12.
95. Bradley, supra note 93, at 750–55.
96. See, e.g., CRS INTERAGENCY REPORT, supra note 89, at 1 n.1.
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memos that establish frameworks for working together in the future. 97
Indeed, many of these tools resemble the nodal mechanisms—or at least
“proto” versions of them—that Chibber argued were so central to South
Korea’s economic development success.
Sometimes, all three tools—statutes, task forces, and memos—are
deployed together. In combatting employment discrimination, for example,
the Civil Rights Act encourages the EEOC “to cooperate with . . . State,
local, and other agencies,” 98 while a somewhat later Executive Order
specifies that DOL should “[r]ecommend to the [EEOC] . . . appropriate
proceedings to be instituted under Title VII.” 99 Between 1966 and 1968
President Johnson convened five interagency task forces examining
expansions of workplace civil rights for various groups, 100 and in 1974 the
DOL and EEOC signed an agreement to share information, expertise, and
complaints. 101
3. Memoranda of Understanding
The “agreement” tool, widely known as a “memorandum of
understanding” or “MOU,” turns out to be the workhorse of formal
interagency collaboration. 102 As the name suggests, MOUs are short,
voluntarily agreed–to documents depicting “an area of mutual interest or
concern that may be addressed cooperatively” by multiple agencies, even
across the local, state, and federal hierarchy. 103 While very little about
MOUs applies universally, some common goals are information sharing,
jurisdictional clarity, policy uniformity, enforcement sign–offs, and
procedural streamlining. 104 At their best, MOUs divvy–up overlapping or
otherwise duplicative responsibilities, establish performance benchmarks,
and set dates for follow–up and revisions, ultimately transforming
collaborative norms in the process. 105 At worst, the agreements are

97.

Freeman & Rossi, supra note 86, at 1157–78.
42 U.S.C. 2000e-4(g)(1) (2012).
99. Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1964–1965).
100. Task Force Reports of the Johnson White House, 1963–1969, Research Collections in
American Politics (William D. Leuchtenburg ed., 2009).
101. Emerson Elec. Co. v. Schlesinger, 609 F.2d 898, 901 (8th Cir. 1979).
102. Freeman & Rossi, supra note 86, at 1161 (calling MOUs “[p]erhaps the most pervasive
instrument of coordination”).
103. U.S. Geological Survey, U.S. Geological Survey Domestic Memorandums of Understanding
(MOU) with Other Federal Agencies or Entities, https://www2.usgs.gov/mou/ (last visited Aug. 2,
2018). See also Freeman & Rossi, supra note 86, at 1161
104. Freeman & Rossi, supra note 86, at 1161.
105. Id. at 1161–62. See also Eduard H. Cadmus, Note, Revisiting the SEC’s Memoranda of
Understanding, 33 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1800, 1854 (2010) (“MOUs . . . prime regulators to
cooperate.”).
98.
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aspirational to the point of irrelevance or signed and never heard from
again. 106
In either case, as procedural documents exempt from notice and
comment and legally unenforceable, MOUs offer flexibility and low
transaction costs but also inherent instability and sometimes
tentativeness. 107 The “political winds” matter, and where storms roll in even
agreements backed by motivated officials may get pushed out or
reassessed. 108 For twenty years ICE and the DOL have had an evolving
MOU coordinating enforcement to help insulate wage claims from
deportation fears, but none of the iterations have empowered labor officials
to kick–start the “uncomfortable conversation” necessary to stop ICE from
timing raids in ways that undermine the memo’s intent.109
MOUs are also, on the whole, less transparent than the other
formalized collaborative devices. Lacking a centralized database, MOUs are
best identified through Google, requests under the Freedom of Information
Act (FOIA) or its state equivalents, and on agency webpages, but even
those avenues can be hit and miss. 110 Some agencies, like the U.S.
Geological Survey, list active, expired, and even template MOUs on a
106.

Freeman & Rossi, supra note 86, at 1165.
Id. at 1161, 1165, 1189–90; See also James W. Moeller, Toward an SEC-FERC
Memorandum of Understanding, 15 ENERGY L.J. 31, 58 (1994) (“[An MOU] is, first and foremost, a
procedural mechanism for the conduct of administrative agency business.”); Pamela Jimenez,
International Securities Enforcement Cooperation Act and Memoranda of Understanding, 31 HARV.
INT’L L.J. 295, 305 (1990) (“MOU’s are merely statements of intent . . . [and] do not establish formal
obligations”). The lack of notice and comment and reviewability changes, however, where an MOU is
deemed “substantive,” meaning it “affects individual rights and obligations.” Emerson Elec. v.
Schleshinger, 609 F.2d 898, 902–04 (8th Cir. 1979).
108. See, e.g., Jayesh M. Rathod, Protecting Immigrant Workers Through Interagency
Cooperation, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 1157, 1160 (2011) (noting the Bush administration’s “silen[ce] about the
1998 MOU between the DOL and the INS, with advocates questioning its ongoing applicability”).
109. See Stephen Lee, Monitoring Immigration Enforcement, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 1089, 1121–23
(2011). See also Rathod, supra note 108, at 1166–67 (regarding more recent MOU developments that
did not solve the problem). A weakness of the MOU was highlighted in 2015, when a union in active
contract negotiations with an employer found its members in the middle of an ICE audit. Yana
Kunichoff, Faced with I-9 Immigration Raid During Negotiations, Chicago Meatpacking Workers
THESE
TIMES
(Jul.
9,
2015,
4:39
PM),
Walked
Off
the
Job,
IN
http://inthesetimes.com/working/entry/18176/confronted_with_an_immigration_raid_during_negotiatio
ns_meatpacking_workers. The union perceived the MOU to bar immigration audits under the
circumstances, yet was limited to writing a letter to the Secretary of Homeland Security urging him to
enforce it. See Letter from D. Taylor, President, UNITE HERE, to Jeh Johnson, Secretary, U.S. Dep’t of
Homeland Sec. (Nov. 18, 2015) http://www.unitehereimmigration.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/ICELETTER-11-15-15.pdf (“The MOU recognizes that immigration enforcement actions should not
undermine effective enforcement of labor laws.”).
110. Freeman & Rossi, supra note 86, at 1189–90 (depicting MOUs as “less visible than other[]”
interagency devices). See also Emerson Elec., 609 F.2d at 902 (describing an interagency MOU where
“[n]o public disclosure is authorized or contemplated”). The FOIA process, however, is no panacea, as
some MOUs may be subject to its disclosure exemptions. See, e.g., Freeman & Rossi, supra note 86, at
1190 n.275 (describing potentially applicable exemptions); Cadmus, supra note 105, at 1852–53 (noting
the addition of an MOU-specific FOIA exemption enacted through other legislation).
107.
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dedicated site overseen by a “point of contact” that the public can call with
questions. 111 Other agencies don’t publicize agreements at all. 112 Here,
federal labor and employment law agencies are relative bright spots, with
OSHA, DOL, EEOC, and NLRB all compiling MOUs online in a format
that is easily searchable by date. 113 A recent agreement spanning the latter
three was accompanied by a press release and attached fact sheet. 114
4. Informal Collaborative Practices
That MOUs allow for such diversity in content, disclosure, and
commitment contributes to their popularity and respected status in the
literature. 115 It also situates the agreements as somewhat of a bridge to
informal collaboration, where agencies exchange information or resources
on their own and in ways that can’t be traced back to a specific legal
authorization or requirement. 116 While informal relations are assumed be to
be both ubiquitous and important to collaborative success overall, 117 they
are also somewhat understudied in law reviews, where analysis, if it exists,
tends to be hedged. 118 Even a Congressional Research Service report
examining interagency practices—which called informal collaborative tools
“large in number and relatively stable over time”—limited its discussion to
a footnote. 119

111. U.S. Geological Survey, U.S. Geological Survey Domestic Memorandums of Understanding
(MOU) with Other Federal Agencies or Entities, https://www2.usgs.gov/mou/ (last visited Aug. 2,
2018).
112. Freeman & Rossi, supra note 86, at 1189–90 (“[M]any interagency agreements are
unpublished . . . .”).
113. EEOC, see Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Memoranda of Understanding,
https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/mous/; DOL, see Department of Labor, Current DOL Memorandums of
Understanding, https://www.dol.gov/whd/federal/FederalMOU.htm; and OSHA, see Occupational
Safety and Health Administration, Memorandums of Understanding, https://www.osha.gov/lawsregs/mou/publicationdate, have MOU-specific pages, while the NLRB lists the agreements alongside
other “Operations-Management Memos” and includes a search box, see National Labor Relations Board,
Operations-Management Memos,
https://www.nlrb.gov/reports-guidance/operations-managementmemos (last visited Mar. 6, 2018).
114. Press Release, National Labor Relations Board, Addendum to the Revised Memorandum of
Understanding between the Departments of Homeland Security and Labor Concerning Enforcement
Activities at Worksites (May 2016), https://www.nlrb.gov/news-outreach/fact-sheets/iwg-addendumfact-sheet.
115. See, e.g., Freeman & Rossi, supra note 86, at 1192 (calling MOUs “highly valuable”);
Cadmus, supra note 105, at 1854–55 (lauding MOUs as a “significantly useful” collaborative tool).
116. Feiock & Scholz, supra note 92, at 26.
117. Freeman & Rossi assume that informal interactions are the very baseline of all interagency
activities and “occur[] as a matter of course.” Freeman & Rossi, supra note 86, at 1156. For an overview
of the important role played by informality in interagency collaboration, see, e.g., Feiock & Scholz,
supra note 92, at 12–13.
118.
See, e.g., Freeman & Rossi, supra note 86, at 1156–57 (describing informal mechanisms that
“might well occur,” “seem[] likely,” or that they “suspect . . . can accomplish a great deal”).
119. CRS INTERAGENCY REPORT, supra note 89, at 1 n.1.
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The situation may in part be attributable to the fact that studying
informal practices is, relative to formal collaboration, harder to do. 120
Interactions unprompted by law or leadership may not leave a paper trail,
and informal arrangements do not lend themselves to “fixed memberships
and responsibilities” of the sort that can be easily tracked. 121
But even if specific examples are, at least on a surface level,
“invisible,” 122 the key ingredient is not. Good informal collaboration takes
good relationships, because where an interaction is not required, familiarity
breeds an openness to reaching out. Every positive contact breaks down the
perceived costs of optional communication and adds bits of interpersonal
trust. 123 In time, agency actors may come to see themselves as enmeshed in
an “ally network” of professionals with common values, and information
sharing and other exchanges can become second nature. 124 Indeed, a crucial
finding in this area is that informal collaboration begets informal
collaboration. That is, the phone calls, lunches, emails, and even chance
encounters build on each other. 125

120. Feiock & Scholz, supra note 92, at 22 (“[T]heoretical and methodological innovation will be
required before the standard individual and institutional-based analyses . . . can help us understand the
critical role of these informal relationships.”).
121. CRS INTERAGENCY REPORT, supra note 89, at 1 n.1. (calling informal agency interactions
“difficult to identify and describe authoritatively”); Freeman & Rossi, supra note 86, at 1156 (listing
“conversations” and “unwritten agreements” as common methods of informal collaboration).
122. Freeman & Rossi, supra note 86, at 1156.
123. See Richard C. Feiock, Rational Choice and Local Government, 29 J. OF URBAN AFF. 47, 57–
58 (2007) (“Dyadic interactions with other governments affect present and future cooperation as
repeated interactions reduce the effort required to put additional new activities in place as partners
develop norms, trust, and comfort working together over time.”); Feiock & Scholz, supra note 92, at 12
(describing patterns of informal relationships as “a process that potentially develops trust and reciprocal
arrangements among members that is critical in reducing the costs of reaching and maintaining an
agreement”). See also Chris Ansell & Alison Gash, Collaborative Governance in Theory and Practice,
18 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 543, 558 (2007) (finding “that trust building often becomes the most
prominent aspect of the early collaborative process” and, though “quite difficult to cultivate,” is possible
through “face-to-face dialogue between stakeholders”).
124. Christopher M. Weible, Collaborative Institutions, Functional Areas, and Beliefs, in SELFORGANIZING FEDERALISM 179, 180 (Richard C. Feiock & John T. Scholz eds., 2010) (describing the
shared “beliefs and values” in ally networks as “enabl[ing] the exchanging, pooling, and sharing of
resources”); Feiock & Scholz, supra note 92, at 304–05 (finding that “collaborative activities like
sharing information and developing joint strategies were common with . . . reported allies”).
125. Jason Marisam has identified a “reciprocity” norm between agencies, where “agencies that
repeatedly interact” build up trust and “an informal obligation that favors ought to be returned.”
Marisam, supra note 91, at 197–98. Studies examining informal collaborations specifically find
something similar: “[F]requency of contacts and the intensity of the relationships . . . significantly
increase the likelihood of future collaboration, suggesting that the quality of the informal relationship
rather than the exchanged resources plays the stronger role in enhancing future collaboration.” Richard
C. Feiock & John T. Scholz, Self-Organizing Mechanisms for Mitigating Institutional Collective Action
Dilemmas: An Assessment and Research Agenda, in SELF-ORGANIZING FEDERALISM 285, 307 (Richard
C. Feiock & John T. Scholz eds., 2010). See also Feiock & Scholz, supra note 92, at 13 (stating that
“one successful” informal collaboration “can increase the likelihood of further efforts”); Ansell & Gash,
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Of course, not all interactions are necessarily positive, and drawbacks
of informal collaboration have been identified. For one, since informal
collaboration is voluntary, it might not happen at all. 126 Some issues,
moreover, may be too complex or multi–faceted to be confronted
casually. 127 Informality can also facilitate bad outcomes. A powerful actor
may spot an opening and unload a difficult problem onto a weaker agency
or strong–arm it into giving up control over a more desirable policy area.128
And informal relations can be afflicted by “pathologies” common to all
forms of collaboration, like a preference to shirk or free ride, the failure to
spot a common bias, opportunity costs, and fundamental disagreements that
halt progress in its tracks. 129
The bottom line is that legal scholarship has noted that collaboration is
happening at all levels and through an amazing diversity of forms. The
result is an administrative system more vibrant than most people probably
imagine. 130 How that vibrancy might translate into transformative
approaches to workplace regulation is central to the prospects of tripartism,
or tripartite-like arrangements, and even a “new labor law.” It is also,
however, strongly mediated by local political configurations and relational
dynamics, as detailed in the final background section below.
D. The Socio–Politics of “Up–and–Down” and “Side–to–Side”
Collaboration
Shannon Gleeson has argued that state–society relations, particularly
between labor and employment law–related agencies and civil society,
hinge crucially on the various configurations of municipal, state, and federal
supra note 123, at 559 (describing the “commitment to collaboration” as requiring a “psychological
shift”).
126. Freeman & Rossi identify a risk of refusal even in formal collaborations due to “substantive
disagreements, personality clashes, or cultural conflicts.” Freeman & Rossi, supra note 86, at 1186–87.
Scholars point out that informal collaborative channels are best developed and sustained where officials
have met outside of the agency context, such as through professional development, community
activities, schooling, or mutual acquaintances. Kenneth N. Bickers et al., The Political Market for
Intergovernmental Cooperation, in SELF-ORGANIZING FEDERALISM 161, 164 (Richard C. Feiock &
John T. Scholz eds., 2010).
127. Feiock & Scholz, supra note 92, at 13–14.
128. Id. at 17–18.
129. Marisam, supra note 91, at 210–15.
130. See Niels Ejersbo & James H. Svara, Bureaucracy and Democracy in Local Government, in
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF URBAN POLITICS 152, 155 (Karen Mossberger et al. eds., 2012)
(“[B]ureacracy is not static . . . . It is continuously challenged and changes on an ongoing basis.
However, its essential position in governance is preserved.”) (citations omitted); Marisam, supra note
91, at 191 (contrasting the “conventional wisdom” of a cabined, relatively rigid administrative state with
the reality of near-constant collaboration). Recently, right wing extremists have reacted to this crossagency vibrancy with fear and suspicion, calling it the “deep state.” See, e.g., Jamie White, Deep State
Panics: America No Longer Believes Us!, INFOWARS (Mar. 6, 2018), https://www.infowars.com/deepstate-panics-america-no-longer-believes-us/ (last visited Aug. 2, 2018).
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authorities in a particular context, or what she calls a “political field.” 131
Given localized political economies, even similar agencies and civil society
actors in different locations may end up behaving in disparate ways. 132 Her
study, for example, details how Houston labor unions and community
groups were forced to rely on horizontal alliances to service the needs of
low–wage workers in response to the city’s conservative, anti–union, and
nativist elements. 133 While advocates did file administrative claims on
workers’ behalf, greater emphasis was placed on direct action and targeting
local agencies and public figures. 134 By contrast, in more Democratic, union
strong, and immigrant-friendly San José, labor and other organizations had
greater freedom to concentrate on traditional workplace and other forms of
organizing because agencies seemed to more reliably enforce individual
rights. 135 The friendlier political environment, in other words, facilitated
state actors’ more specialized––and, we could add, complementary––
response to legal violations. 136
Gleeson’s account suggests that the fertile ground for tripartism,
corporatism, or even something like the new labor law is likely to be found
in politically progressive and labor-friendly enclaves. Indeed, the sheer
number of successful campaigns for municipal social welfare regulation
like higher minimum wages, paid sick leave, fair scheduling, and anti–wage
theft ordinances 137 have sparked discussion about a “turn to localism,” the
“rise of the progressive city,” and cities in “revolt.” 138 The victories have
even forced scholars to reevaluate the conventional wisdom that
development–centric, pro–growth forces crowd out possibilities for people–

131.

GLEESON, supra note 82, at 16–18.
Id. at 16–23.
133. While Gleeson acknowledges that Houston is a relatively progressive city that organized
labor preferred to others in the state, “red” Texas inevitably impacted the overall political context and
labor’s capacity to find allies. Id. at 97–98.
134. Id. at 135–38.
135. Id. at 22–23.
136. Id.
137. For example, in just the last six years, over two dozen cities have enacted paid sick days
legislation. See NAT’L P’SHIP FOR WOMEN & FAMILIES, PAID SICK DAYS (updated Oct. 2018),
http://www.nationalpartnership.org/research-library/work-family/psd/paid-sick-days-statutes.pdf. Since
2013, nine cities have passed $15-an–hour wage floors—more than double the federal minimum. NAT’L
EMP’T LAW PROJECT, MINIMUM WAGE LAWS: RECENT TRENDS AND ECONOMIC EVIDENCE, 1 (Apr.
2016),
http://www.nelp.org/content/uploads/City-Minimum-Wage-Laws-Recent-Trends-EconomicEvidence.pdf (“[Weak wage growth] has prompted a record number of municipal leaders to tackle this
problem locally with city minimum wage ordinances that substantially raise the wage floor for low-paid
workers in their communities.”). See also RICHARD SCHRAGGER, CITY POWER URBAN GOVERNANCE IN
A GLOBAL AGE 140–41 (2016).
138. See Scott L. Cummings, Law in the Labor Movement’s Challenge to Wal-Mart, 95 CALIF. L.
REV. 1927, 1942–43 (2007); Michelle Goldberg, The Rise of the Progressive City, NATION, Apr. 2,
2014; Harold Meyerson, The Revolt of the Cities, AM. PROSPECT, Apr. 22, 2014; UNIONS AND THE CITY:
NEGOTIATING URBAN CHANGE (Ian Thomas MacDonald ed., 2017).
132.
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powered redistributionist agendas in urban areas.139 That stated, the San
José and Silicon Valley depicted by Gleeson and the headlines generated by
cutting edge ordinances in New York City, San Francisco, or Washington,
D.C. are just slices of the country. The Houston experience, not to mention
cities like Tuscaloosa or Chattanooga, may speak for just as large a swath
of the United States.
Nevertheless, labor appears poised to push ahead, and there are reasons
to feel optimistic about the efforts. One of us, applying a sociological lens
similar to Gleeson’s, has found that urban worker center strategies
increasingly center upon attempts to close collaborative gaps between
organized progressive forces (including faith–based groups and traditional
unions) and elected officials, seemingly reconfiguring presumed political
arrangements. 140 Unions, moreover, have seemingly adopted a trial–and–
error approach to organizing that takes advantage of opportunities whenever
and wherever they might arise. 141 As movement scholars Miriam Goldberg
and Penny Lewis have argued, for modern activists, the city is the “new
factory.” 142
This time, though, progress would seem to depend less on the right
pro-union pitch and more on the right constellation of agency–to–agency
(side–to–side) and agency–to–advocate (up–and–down) dealings. Because
if the new labor law or some variant rests on government as an “active
participant” and “co–negotiator in determining workers’ material
conditions,” 143 how well activists engage with the state and how efficiently
the relevant bureaucracies interact to facilitate the desired aim are
indicators of the strategy’s likely success or failure.
And from there, relationships, again, take center stage. Professor
Richard Schragger points out that while recent social bargaining successes
are “components of a more comprehensive campaign to redefine the
relationship between labor and capital at the municipal level,” that’s

139. SCHRAGGER, supra note 137, at 2–7, 16–17, 164–68 (depicting cities as a mass
“agglomeration of persons, goods, and capital” in a relational space that can be “responsive to values
other than economic growth,” including “the views of citizens across a wide range of policy areas”).
140. César F. Rosado Marzán, Worker Centers and the Moral Economy, 17 CHI. LEGAL FORUM
409 (2017). See also Ruth Milkman, Introduction, Toward a New Labor Movement? Organizing New
York City’s Precariat, in NEW LABOR IN NEW YORK: PRECARIOUS WORKERS AND THE FUTURE OF THE
LABOR MOVEMENT 16–17 (Ruth Milkman & Ed Ott eds., 2014) (noting how worker centers are better
suited than traditional labor unions to bridge dichotomies of class identity, linking workplace issues to
more political ones).
141. See Oswalt, supra note 20 (arguing that alt-labor campaigns, even if funded and orchestrated
by traditional labor unions, are using a plurality of experimental tactics and strategies that can be
understood as “improvisational”).
142. THE CITY IS THE NEW FACTORY: NEW SOLIDARITIES AND SPATIAL STRATEGIES IN AN URBAN
AGE 5–6 (Miriam Greenberg & Penny Lewis eds., 2017).
143. Andrias, supra note 3, at 10, 68.
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because cities tend to be where the inter–personal and inter–political
dynamics make rights enhancements possible. 144
Indeed, the empirics on new forms of organizing and rights’
enforcement suggest that in the absence of law–instigated partnerships, the
future of state–society collaboration is likely to depend on factors like trust,
connectedness, and inclusiveness, perhaps at first in an ad hoc way but
ultimately in a primary way. Wage boards provide formality, transparency,
and certainty, but also exceptionality. In the absence of boards or similar
centralizing bodies, existing socio–political architecture may drive—or
deter—the possibilities of U.S. tripartism, corporatism, or the incipient new
labor law.
Below, we seek to excavate that sort of social blueprint. Using Chicago
as a case study, our goal is not only to map relevant relations among and
between advocates and administrators, but to identify and draw out the
relational, institutional, and political elements likely to be central in future
labor and employment law collaborations across the country.
II. METHODS
Our investigation proceeded on two tracks. First, one of us, Professor
Rosado Marzán, spent nearly a year as a participant observer at Arise
Chicago, a local worker center. 145 Second, both of us conducted “elite”
144. SCHRAGGER, supra note 137, at 141. See also Ejersbo & Svara, supra note 130, at 168–69
(describing new understandings of local governance, where “connections [between bureaucracy and
citizens] have broadened and deepened . . . [and] [t]op administrators have become committed to
advancing citizen participation and strengthening community attachment”). To be sure, hope that the
reforms will eventually “bubble” up is essentially explicit. Claire Cain Miller, Liberals Turn to Cities to
TIMES
(Jan.
26,
2016),
Pass
Laws
and
Spread
Ideas,
N.Y.
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/26/upshot/liberals-turn-to-cities-to-pass-laws-and-spread-ideas.html
(citing a San Francisco official’s belief that the “more local jurisdictions that tackle these issues, the
more momentum there is for statewide and eventually national action”). See also Meyerson, supra note
138 (describing progressive city legislation as possibly “charting a new course for American
liberalism”).
145. Rosado Marzán performed one- to three-day weekly participant observations as a workplace
organizer from February 2015 to September 2015 and from January 2016 to May 2016. A primary duty
included intakes of workers’ alleged complaints against employers, which he analyzed to determine
colorable claims and whether the center might effectively engage with the worker to initiate a campaign
to remedy those grievances. Some workers had complex legal problems that could not be resolved
through workplace campaigns, or at least not exclusively. Terminated workers with employer-provided
housing, for example, risked immediate homelessness. In such situations, quick injunctive relief was
required, often backed up by the support of other kinds of more focused community organizations such
as tenant groups. Lacking strong campaign allies in the suburbs, Arise also did not generally get
involved where workers lived or worked outside the Chicago metropolitan area. The worker center
would also usually avoid campaigns where a complaining worker was already represented by a labor
union with exclusive representation rights over the grievance. Where engaged, Arise’s workplace
campaigns could include demand letters, meeting requests for a negotiated settlement, picketing, and
complaining to state and local authorities. The author led a handful of such campaigns and supported
others that were led by the full-time staff organizer. He also participated in weekly staff meetings to
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interviews with civil society groups and federal, state, and local agency
officials. Elite interviews focus on persons who are particularly
knowledgeable about a substantive topic and its context.146 Here, our elite
subjects were representatives of government agencies and civil society
organizations involved in enforcing or advocating for new labor and
employment laws in Chicago or Illinois.
Arise Chicago is one of the most prominent worker centers in the
United States, 147 and, like many, engages in both workplace and policy
campaigns. Thus, the first track provided us with a direct window into
cutting edge individual and broad–based advocacy, as well as a
foundational sense of how activists seek to engage state agencies and how
those agencies, in turn, respond.
The second track included 18 hour–long interviews with Chicago
advocates and city, state, and federal agency officials.148 Because we
identified subjects based on their positions of authority, interviewees tended
to be executive directors of civil society organizations or heads of
administrative departments or even the agency itself. The second track
greatly expanded (and in many cases corroborated) data gleaned from track
one. Most importantly, these interviews filled–in the finer details of inter–
agency collaborative work across and between many levels of government.
The agency interviews were as follows:
(1) An official at the National Labor Relations Board, Region 13 (NLRB);
(2) Four Chicago–based representatives of the Occupational Health and
Safety Administration (OHSA);
(3) Two Chicago–based representatives, and one Minnesota–based
representative, of the Wage and Hour Division of the U.S. Department of
Labor (WHD);
learn about the work of other organizers engaged in strategic work with labor unions, faith-labor
solidarity activism, policy campaigns (including the paid sick time effort, infra Part III.E), and domestic
worker organizing. He additionally participated in several policy-related activities, such as lobbying
state legislators in Springfield, assisting in roundtable discussions with government agencies in charge
of federal and state labor laws, and meeting agency heads and officers to request better legal
enforcement. Finally, he participated in several “Know Your Rights” workshops given to all workers
seeking Arise’s assistance. Rosado Marzán recorded his observations as daily “jottings” in pocket-sized
reporter notebooks. He then translated the “jottings” into more formal field notes. His fieldwork also
often led to short self-directed memos. These memos served as preliminary analyses of his data, where
he tried to make sense of what he was experiencing and establish themes observed in the fieldwork.
146. BILL GILLHAM, RESEARCH INTERVIEWING: THE RANGE OF TECHNIQUES 54 (2010).
147. Arise Chicago, then known as the Chicago Interfaith Workers Rights Center, was a repeat
player in Janice Fine’s foundational work on the U.S. worker center movement. See FINE, supra note 10,
at 22, 125.
148. All interviews occurred between late 2015 and the first eight months of 2017. All interviews
but one were conducted in-person, in Chicago. During six of the 18 interviews, both authors were
present, asked questions, and compiled both hand-written and typed transcriptions. One subject was
interviewed separately by each author. Having dual sets of notes allowed the authors to corroborate facts
gathered and understood from the interviews. The one interview not conducted in-person was conducted
in Chicago by both authors over the phone.
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(4) A former representative of the Illinois Department of Labor (IDOL or
state DOL), who served until 2015;
(5) An official at the Illinois Attorney General (IL AG), Workplace Rights
Bureau;
(6) An official at the City of Chicago Department of Business Affairs and
Consumer Protection (BACP).

In addition to the 7 permanent staff members of Arise Chicago, the
civil society interviews included representatives of the following groups:
(1) The Chicago Federation of Labor, AFL–CIO (CFL);
(2) The Fight for $15;
(3) The Chicago Workers’ Collaborative (CWC);
(4) The Restaurant Opportunities Center–Chicago (ROC Chicago);
(5) The Raise the Floor Alliance (RTF), a coalition of seven Chicago-area
worker centers.

We also made unsuccessful attempts to interview Chicago
representatives of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, the
United States Chamber of Commerce, and the Illinois Retail Merchants
Association. 149
Our interviews concluded once we determined we had reached a
sufficient level of data “saturation,” 150 suggesting that further investigation
was likely to lead to redundancy or at least not new or contradictory
information. In fact, interviews twelve through eighteen tended mostly to
confirm, expand, or add new players to details obtained through Rosado
Marzán’s earlier fieldwork. The lack of employer perspectives, however,
narrows the scope of our conclusions to data gleaned from agency officials
and labor advocates only. Evidence and analysis presented in Parts III and
IV should be understood with that limit in mind.
Finally, where possible, we attempted to triangulate data through
documentary evidence such as newspaper articles and legal filings, all cited
herein. This process allowed us to fill certain substantive gaps left by
participant observation, interview constraints,151 or the lack of employer
involvement.

149.

These invitations either went unanswered or were declined.
IRVING SEIDMAN, INTERVIEWING AS QUALITATIVE RESEARCH: A GUIDE FOR RESEARCHERS
IN EDUCATION AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 55 (4th ed. 2013) (defining saturation as a state where the
interviewer receives similar information from subjects and no longer learns anything new).
151. For example, while a sixty-minute interview allows for conversation on a wide range of
topics, it also generates threads that could benefit from extended discussion.
150.
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III. THE CHICAGO STORY
Chicago, like every city, 152 has a work law enforcement problem. 153 A
recent survey of low–wage city workers found that almost three–quarters
could cite multiple rights violations at their current job, and an astonishing
80% reported employer backlash after trying to access the law’s protections
by filing a complaint with a state or federal agency. 154 Nearly as often
workers report being scared into silence, opting not to protest at all. 155 A
local advocacy group has placed special blame on a “complicated
patchwork of enforcement frameworks” and summed up the results as proof
of “more sweatshops than Starbucks” in Chicago. 156
Into this setting steps a variety of unions, worker centers, non–profits,
religious organizations, politicians, and city, state, and federal agencies, all
with the broad aim of improving working conditions in the city. A good
deal of progress has been made, and, as discussed in subpart III.E, in some
ways Chicago sits at the vanguard of employee–friendly legislative reform.
Our research reveals a large number of up-and-down, side-to-side, and
mixed collaborative practices (See Table 1). We categorized these practices
along a continuum in order of ascending formality, from (1) forging one–
on–one, interpersonal commitments; (2) to one–off projects in service of a
near–term goal; (3) to routinized dealings; (4) to a diversity of MOUs; (5)
to campaigns for concrete legislative enactments. The five categories will
be treated in turn.

152. One study found that over $15 billion is stolen from workers’ paychecks every year. DAVID
COOPER & TERESA KROEGER, ECONOMIC POLICY INSTITUTE, EMPLOYERS STEAL BILLIONS FROM
WORKERS’ PAYCHECKS EACH YEAR 2, 5–6 (2017), http://www.epi.org/publication/employers-stealbillions-from-workers-paychecks-each-year-survey-data-show-millions-of-workers-are-paid-less-thanthe-minimum-wage-at-significant-cost-to-taxpayers-and-state-economies/. Depending on the study, rates
of routine minimum wage theft range from 17% to 26% and shoot up to 76% when overtime violations
are considered. See id. at 2 (reporting 17%); ANNETTE BERNHARDT ET AL., BROKEN LAWS,
UNPROTECTED
WORKERS
2
(2009),
www.nelp.org/content/uploads/2015/03/BrokenLawsReport2009.pdf?nocdn=1 (reporting 26% “in the
previous work week”). The numbers do not improve when other workplace laws are studied. See, e.g.,
id. at 4 (reporting a 50% rate of retaliation for filing a workers’ compensation claim and that 33% of
claimants were wrongly forced to pay bills out-of-pocket).
153. See generally NIK THEODORE ET AL., CENTER FOR URBAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT,
UNREGULATED WORK IN CHICAGO i–iv (2010) (describing failed enforcement of employment
protections in Chicago).
154. BRITTANY SCOTT, NAT’L ECON. & SOC. RIGHTS INITIATIVE, CHALLENGING THE BUSINESS OF
FEAR: ENDING WORKPLACE RETALIATION, ENFORCING WORKERS’ RIGHTS 5, 11, 13 (2016),
http://www.raisetheflooralliance.org/report.
155. Id. at 17.
156. Jeff Schuhrke, New Study Finds ‘More Sweatshops than Starbucks’ in Chicago, IN THESE
TIMES
(May
19,
2017,
1:24
PM),
http://inthesetimes.com/working/entry/20147/new_study_finds_more_sweatshops_than_starbucks_in_c
hicago.
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Table 1: Observed and/or Reported Collaborative Activities in Chicago
Up-and-Down

Side-to-Side

Mixed

Surveilling and
documenting
violations of the Day
and Temporary
Labor Services Act
(IDOL & CWC)

Investigating the use of
machine labor by minors
(OSHA & fed. DOL)

Investigating and
litigating wage and
hour violations in
Chinese buffet
restaurants (IL
AG/fed. DOL/IDOL &
various worker
centers)

Documenting and
investigating ULP
charges (NLRB &
Fight for
$15/ARISE)

Facilitating food trucks at
airports (BACP & Chicago
Dept. of Aviation)

Organizing workshops
on the U-Visa program
(IDOL/fed. DOL/
NLRB/EEOC &
various worker
centers)

Filing and tracking
wage complaints
(IDOL & RTF)

“Blitzing” worksites for
employee misclassifications
(IDOL/IL AG/IL Dept. of
Employment Security)

Establishing the
Chicago-Area
Interagency Workers’
Rights Roundtable
(Various agencies and
consulates & various
worker advocates)

Experimenting with
the IL
Whistleblower Act
to enforce antiretaliation provisions
(OSHA & CWC)

Staff exchanges between
agencies (IDOL & IL AG)

Meetings to revive a
“universal workplace
complaint form”
(Various agencies &
various worker
advocates)

Regulating
electronic payroll
cards (IL AG &
Fight for $15)

Referring cases between
agencies to match staffing
skill sets and needs (IDOL &
fed. DOL)

Participating in the
Working Families
Task Force, leading to
the Paid Sick Leave
Ordinance (Various
worker centers,
unions, public
officials, employers,
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and trade associations)
Reporting
workplace
complaints though a
“Bat Phone” at the
Thompson Center
(IL AG & various
worker centers and
unions)

Interagency MOUs:
•

•

•
•

Reporting health
and safety concerns
by OSHA-certified
Peer Educators
through the “No
More Deaths”
temporary worker
program (OSHA &
CWC)

Referring cases and
coordinating filing
deadlines and
remedial schemes
(OSHA & NLRB;
IDOL & fed. DOL)
Transferring prior
case files (NLRB &
Chicago Commission
on Human Relations)
Cross-institutional
trainings (fed. DOL
& EEOC)
Joint investigations
(fed. DOL & EEOC;
fed. DOL & IDOL)

Agency-Consular MOUs:
•

Accepting,
processing, and
transferring
complaints
(NLRB/OSHA &
Mexican Consulate)

A. Coffees and Calls: Forging Interpersonal Commitments
Consistently, agency officials expressed broad support for all sorts of
collaborations. Handing wage and hour investigations off to a willing
partner agency at the IDOL, 157 borrowing an expert to identify the source of
a blood contaminant at OSHA, 158 and equipping worker centers, churches,
and nurses with tools to spread legal rights education159 at various state and

157.

Interview with Ill. Dep’t of Labor Officer, in Chi., Ill. (Apr. 1, 2017).
Interview with OSHA Experts, in Chi., Ill. (June 14, 2017).
159. Interview with Ill. Dep’t of Labor Officer, in Chi., Ill. (April 1, 2017). See also Interview with
OSHA Experts, in Chi., Ill. (June 14, 2017); Interview with NLRB Officer, in Chi., Ill. (Feb. 9, 2017).
158.
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federal agencies 160 are all seen as pushing against the realities of under–
resourcing and understaffing. As a federal officer explained, where a budget
line can’t be stretched or doesn’t exist, there’s just “no other way.” 161
But it is how these sorts of partnerships proceed that reveals the most
pervasive up–and–down and side–to–side collaborative practice in Chicago:
a commitment to repeated personal contacts. An official who recently
transferred into the city is an object lesson. Forced to start from relational
ground zero, he described his collaborative philosophy as “cold calls and
coffee.” 162 That is to say, he calls up counterparts at other agencies, starts
conversations, and then makes an invitation to continue these conversations
in person outside of the office. These are certainly “getting–to–know–you”
interactions, but they are not just that. A goal is also to identify a common
denominator that might ground future calls and coffees. 163 Often it turns
out to be work–related, like a shared interest in efficiently accessing
personnel files during retaliatory firing investigations. 164 But sometimes it is
personal. A mutual family history once set the table for information sharing
between state and federal labor agencies.165
As a former Illinois Department of Labor official admitted, cultivating
the sorts of relationships that motivate moves across bureaucratic
boundaries is not easy. It takes time and effort, of course, but also a
willingness to “experiment” with different people to find the right fit. 166
Sometimes simple geography helps, as in three cases where a different
agency or division sits downstairs or down the hall and impromptu
encounters happen all the time. 167 For many of the state and federal officials
we spoke with, dashed emails, quick calls, and harried catch–ups across
agencies are routinized, prioritized, and seen as necessary for doing their
jobs effectively. 168
Outside groups also stress the importance of steady agency contacts to
do their work, but the emphasis is mediated by the nature of advocacy in a
large city like Chicago. Over and again, leaders highlighted recurring

160. Interview with NLRB Officer, in Chi., Ill. (Feb. 9, 2017); Interview with Ill. Dep’t of Labor
Officer, in Chi., Ill. (April 1, 2017); Interview with Ill. Att’y Gen. Officer, in Chi., Ill. (Feb. 2, 2017).
161. Interview with NLRB Officer, in Chi., Ill. (Feb. 9, 2017); Interview with Ill. Dep’t of Labor
Officer, in Chi., Ill. (Apr. 1, 2017).
162. Interview with NLRB Officer, in Chi., Ill. (Feb. 9, 2017).
163. See id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Interview with Ill. Dep’t of Labor Officer, in Chi., Ill. (Apr. 1, 2017).
167. Interview with Ill. Att’y Gen. Officer, in Chi., Ill. (Feb. 2, 2017); Interview with Ill. Dep’t of
Labor Officer, in Chi., Ill. (Apr. 1, 2017).
168. Interview with NLRB Officer, in Chi., Ill. (Feb. 9, 2017); Interview with Ill. Dep’t of Labor
Officer, in Chi., Ill. (Apr. 1, 2017). See also Interview with Ill. Att’y Gen. Officer, in Chi., Ill. (Feb. 2,
2017).
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interactions with specific officials, but almost invariably accompanied by
an aside about the person’s roots in the activist community. The most
striking example involves the Illinois Department of Labor, where the past
Manager of the Fair Labor Standards Division had at various times worked
for Raise the Floor, a worker center coalition; the Chicago Workers
Collaborative (CWC), a worker center; UNITE-HERE, a union; and a wellknown local progressive politician. 169
Biographies like these come not only with ready–made credibility and
pre–scripted introductions, they also facilitate natural outreach. Indeed, the
IDOL official’s name arose repeatedly in stories of agency contacts, where
her tenure was marked by uniformly glowing descriptors. 170 Community
rootedness also seems to create uniquely fertile terrain for recurrent
communications. The official explained how an influx of colleagues with
similar non–profit backgrounds sparked an incredible vibrancy at the
agency, with discussions often centered on how best to welcome “groups to
the table.” 171
When the contacts click, it can create a kind of collaborative
symbiosis. By the early 2000s, both advocates and the IDOL had grown
frustrated by the existing minimum wage law’s inability to deter employer
abuses in Illinois’s booming temporary services industry. 172 The fix was an
industry–specific law pushed by a coalition spearheaded by the CWC at the
express suggestion of an IDOL official—but not just any agency official. 173
Having previously served as an AFL–CIO executive who deftly mediated a
friction between the budding worker center and the federation many years
earlier, she was central to the CWC’s lore. 174 Once passed, the Day and
Temporary Services Act became a mutual inflection point for the CWC’s
organizing and the IDOL’s enforcement agenda.
Synergies are also found at the NLRB, where an official who has been
called “cutting edge” for his inclusive approach to communication with
outside groups 175 expressed appreciation for Fight for $15’s and ARISE’s
careful documentation and vetting of unfair labor practice filings. 176 Not
only do well–evidenced charges increase agency efficiency, the official
believes the groups’ active engagement in the process improves the
performance of the NLRB’s officers by raising issues and factual nuances

169.

Interview with Raise the Floor All. Staffer, in Chi., Ill. (Feb. 14, 2017).
Id.; Interview with Arise Chi. Officer, in Chi., Ill. (Mar. 3, 2017).
171. Interview with Ill. Dep’t of Labor Officer, in Chi., Ill. (Apr. 1, 2017).
172. Interview with Chi. Workers’ Collaborative Staffer, in Chi., Ill. (June 2, 2017); Interview with
Raise the Floor All. Staffer in Chi., Ill. (Feb. 14, 2017).
173. Interview with Chi. Workers’ Collaborative Staffer, in Chi., Ill. (June 2, 2017).
174. Id.
175. Id. See also Interview with NLRB Officer, in Chi., Ill. (Feb. 9, 2017).
176. Interview with NLRB Officer, in Chi., Ill. (Feb. 9, 2017).
170.
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that might otherwise be overlooked. 177 The groups, in turn, see the official
as an ally when they believe an agency is not following procedural rules,
such as the right for a non–lawyer to file a Notice of Appearance and attend
a witness interview. 178
Thus, where durable commitments to outreach are found, highly
informal—but also meaningful—collaboration can follow. The problem is
that sometimes that commitment can’t be found, and other times it is not so
durable. Most obviously, not everyone is interested in a call, let alone
coffee. An official committed to reaching out in these ways admitted that
his voicemails sometimes go unanswered. 179 When a team of advocates
once publicly inquired why federal agencies did not routinely share facts
relevant to joint–employer findings, an administrator responded with a quip
about twenty–year old computer technology. 180 Hence, in the absence of
legal mandates for collaborative administrative practice, relationships
matter, but relationships are difficult to kindle.
Also, people are transitory. Chicago’s BACP, the sole entity
responsible for policing the municipal minimum wage, has had four
Commissioners in four years. 181 Sometimes the changes are forced. The
2014 election of a new governor prompted a wave of high–level departures
at the IDOL that shattered relationships across the advocate community. 182
Much of Raise the Floor’s pre–2015 work, for example, revolved around
the filing and tracking of wage complaints filed by its eight associated
worker centers. 183 Early on, the process was scattershot as claims proceeded
or got dismissed and even lost without centralized tracking or sometimes

177. Id. A federal DOL official made a similar point with respect to wage and hour charges
referred by local unions. Interview with U.S. Dep’t of Labor Officers, in Chi., Ill. (July 19, 2017).
Advocates at both ROC Chicago and Fight for $15 stated that they took pride in their organization’s
work in bringing well-constructed legal charges. Interview with Rest. Opportunities Ctr. Chi. Staffer, in
Chi., Ill. (July 21, 2017); Telephone Interview with Fight for $15 Officer (Apr. 19, 2017).
178. Id. at 4; Field notes from César F. Rosado Marzán (June 22, 2016) (on file with author). See
also Interview with Raise the Floor Staffer, in Chi., Ill. (Feb. 14, 2017).
179. Interview with NLRB Officer, in Chi., Ill. (Feb. 9, 2017).
180. Field notes from César F. Rosado Marzán (June 22, 2016) (on file with author).
181. See Press Release, Office of the Mayor of the City of Chicago, Mayor Emanuel Announces
Maria Guerra Lapacek to be New Commissioner of the Department of Business Affairs and Consumer
Protection
(Jan.
2,
2014),
https://www.cityofchicago.org/content/dam/city/depts/mayor/Press%20Room/Press%20Releases/2014/J
anuary/1.2.14Guerra.pdf; Fran Spielman, Emanuel shuffles cabinet after appointment of city clerk, Chi.
Sun Times (Dec. 19. 2016, 5:08 PM), https://chicago.suntimes.com/news/emanuel-shuffles-cabinetafter-appointment-of-city-clerk/ (replacing the Commissioner); Press Release, Office of the Mayor of
the City of Chicago, Mayor Emanuel Introduces Financial and Regulatory Cabinet Appointments to City
Council
(May
24,
2017),
https://www.cityofchicago.org/content/dam/city/depts/mayor/Press%20Room/Press%20Releases/2017/
May/052417_CabinetAppointments.pdf (replacing the Commissioner).
182. Interview with Ill. Dep’t of Labor Officer, in Chi., Ill. (Apr. 1, 2017).
183. Interview with Raise the Floor All. Staffer, in Chi., Ill. (Feb. 14, 2017).
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notification. 184 Eventually, though, the agency arranged a point person for
all the RTF–related claims and in–person monthly meetings were
established to provide feedback on individual cases. 185 As the relationship
deepened, the official became a sounding board for RTF commentaries on
the agency’s general functioning, including critiques of the claim submittal
form itself. 186 “We felt heard,” said a RTF leader before noting that the
agency promptly fixed the form. 187 When IDOL later asked RTF to gather
testimony in favor of pending Wage Payment and Collection Act
regulations, the group agreed to help because of the agency’s commitment
to inclusion. 188
Yet, by 2015, the new governor was in, the politically–appointed IDOL
official was out, and the meetings were discontinued. 189 Since then the
agency has unilaterally altered the claim form and instituted a new
requirement that workers submit evidence directly to their employers, a
process RTF believes is intimidating to employees and confusing to
employers. 190 Requests to reverse the change have not been successful.191
It is probably not surprising that highly personalized, contact–based
collaboration might suffer when a favored official departs, but repairing the
damage can be harder than might be expected. That is because advocates
evince a baseline distrust of agencies that even biography cannot—at least
initially—overcome. Having been hired directly from the activist
community, one state official was shocked to find her recent colleagues
reacting coolly to her early attempts at outreach: “Even me!” she stressed.192
Absent an established tie, worker center representatives expressed a
generalized caution in their administrative dealings, with one likening the
best–case scenario to casual friends who will never be “best buddies.” 193
Another activist warned of “deadwood” officers, long–time civil servants
unwilling to collaborate with activists or pursue damages with even the best
of facts. 194 A third thought impotence was endemic to the structure of
bureaucracy and that even a “revolutionary” ensconced at the top of an
agency could not do much to impact widespread wage theft. 195
184. Interview with Ill. Dep’t of Labor Officer, in Chi., Ill. (Apr. 1, 2017). See also Interview with
Arise Chi. Staffer, in Chi., Ill. (March 3, 2017) (recounting lost claims and checks).
185. Interview with Raise the Floor All. Staffer, in Chi., Ill. (Feb. 14, 2017).
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Interview with Ill. Dep’t of Labor Officer, in Chi., Ill. (Apr. 1, 2017).
193. Field notes from César F. Rosado Marzán (June 23, 2016) (on file with author).
194. Interview with Chi. Workers’ Collaborative Staffer, in Chi., Ill. (June 2, 2017).
195. Interview with Arise Chi. Staffer, in Chi., Ill. (Mar. 3, 2017).
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Still, if a theme emerged across and between advocates and agencies, it
was relational optimism in a sense suggested by a veteran labor advocate:
anybody can be organized. Even, apparently, in our decentralized and
perhaps even incoherent administrative state. 196 This faith in organizing
echoed clearly in the disappointment expressed by the departed IDOL
official that the monthly claim meetings so central to her former work had
ended. 197 She was confident the relationship could have continued, but it
would have taken “calls” from “day 1.” 198 Even now, having wanted to see
the ritual become part of the older administration’s legacy, she hoped
neither side would “give up.” 199 RTF, for its part, says it will keep trying. 200
Thus, it appears that agencies and civil society groups do relate and
work together to enforce certain labor rights. However, the relationships are
difficult to maintain. As we discovered, a change in government
administration can destroy four years of relationships. And at other times,
ensconced bureaucrats, the so–called “deadwood” detailed by one activist,
may create permanent obstacles to collaboration.
B. One–Offs
The most accessible benefit of an established, mutual commitment to
outreach appears to be the eased opportunity to work together on narrowlydefined, isolated, or time-limited projects, a collaborative practice we shorthand with the term “one–offs.” Many were found in Chicago. The greatest
number of one-offs are interagency and arise out of naturally overlapping
legal issues, harkening back to something remarked on by both agency and
worker center representatives: where there’s one employment law violation,
others are waiting to be found. 201
A good example is the Illinois Attorney General’s suit against a
number of Chinese buffet restaurants. Worker centers and legal aid groups
identified initial wage violations, triggering investigations by the state and
federal DOL and cross–agency calls to the AG’s Workplace Rights Bureau,
which followed up with administrative subpoenas. 202 That work ensnared
more defendants, including employment agencies using Chinese
newspapers to advertise the availability of “good Mexican workers.” 203
196.

Interview with Chi. Workers’ Collaborative Staffer, in Chi., Ill. (June 2, 2017).
Interview with Ill. Dep’t of Labor Officer, in Chi., Ill. (Apr. 1, 2017).
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Interview with Raise the Floor All. Staffer, in Chi., Ill. (Feb. 14, 2017).
201. Interview with OSHA Experts, in Chi., Ill. (June 14, 2017).
202. Interview with Ill. Att’y Gen. Officer, in Chi., Ill. (Feb. 2, 2017). See also Interview with Ill.
Dep’t of Labor Officer, in Chi., Ill. (April 1, 2017).
203. Id. See also Complaint at 20, People v. Xing Ying Emp’t Agency, No. 15-cv-10235 (N.D. Ill.
Apr. 22, 2016) [hereinafter “Complaint”].
197.
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Once matched with an employer, employees owed “commissions” to the
agencies and rent to the buffets, all remitted back through wages ranging
from $3.00 to $6.00 an hour. 204 A handful of EEOC right–to–sue letters
later, the AG’s ultimate complaint canvassed a slew of state and federal
wage, break, and civil rights claims. 205
Similar examples abound. OSHA investigations of machinery used by
minors prompts outreach to the child labor wing at Wage and Hour; 206 the
BACP wants to station food trucks at the airport to help feed long–sitting
cabbies and works on a plan with the Chicago Department of Aviation; 207 or
an IDOL/IL AG tag team plan a misclassification “blitz” on worksites
armed with Illinois Department of Employment Security data on big
businesses purporting to employ no one. 208
But across–the–board, greatest enthusiasm was expressed not for
projects sparked by statute or jurisdiction but by affinities built up between
two people. Relationships, again, matter. For example, one worker center
representative expressed extreme frustration with the Occupational Safety
and Health Act’s weakness, particularly its failure to protect vulnerable
workers from retaliation after submitting claims. 209 He also, however, had
deep ties to a local regional director, and his tone brightened in noting that
the director had encouraged the center to “experiment” with the state’s new
Whistleblower Act, which applies to federal claims and includes
compensatory damages and attorney’s fees. 210 From OSHA to workers’
compensation, this tip has universally altered the center’s attitude toward a
range of weak retaliatory frameworks. 211
A unique relationship also shaped the state Attorney General’s office
approach to the regulation of payroll cards, where employers save money—
and workers get charged—to have pay put on debit cards instead of directly
in a bank account or on a check. 212 Existing law was silent on the practice,
204. See Interview with Ill. Att’y Gen. Officer, in Chi., Ill. (Feb. 2, 2017); Complaint, supra note
203, at 3, 16–18 (“Most Latino employees sleep on the floor or on dirty mattresses that they have
retrieved from garbage dumpsters. Rooms are infested with bed bugs, rats, or other vermin.”).
205. Interview with Ill. Att’y Gen. Officer, in Chi., Ill. (Feb. 2, 2017); Complaint, supra note 203,
at 4.
206. Interview with OSHA Experts, in Chi., Ill. (June 14, 2017); Interview with U.S. Dep’t of
Labor Officers, in Chi., Ill. (July 19, 2017).
207. Interview with City of Chi. Dep’t of Business Affairs & Consumer Prot. Official, in Chi., Ill.
(June 22, 2017).
208. Interview with Ill. Dep’t of Labor Officer, in Chi., Ill. (Apr. 1, 2017).
209. Interview with Chi. Workers’ Collaborative Staffer, in Chi., Ill. (June 2, 2017).
210. Id. See also 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 174/15, 30 (2018).
211. Interview with Chi. Workers’ Collaborative Staffer, in Chi., Ill. (June 2, 2017).
212. See, e.g., Alejandra Cancino, Gov. Quinn Signs Payroll Cards Bill into Law, CHI. TRIB. (Aug.
6, 2014, 2:14 PM), https://www.chicagotribune.com/business/chi-illinois-payroll-cards-bill-20140806story.html (“Businesses prefer the cards because they save $2.75 each time they electronically load the
card instead of cutting a check.”).
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and while there was general agreement that it was abusive, the remedy was
shaped by the head of the Workplace Rights Bureau’s encounter with fast
food workers, thanks to Fight for $15. 213 In short, a lot of workers liked the
cards. 214 Without a bank account, direct deposit is useless and checks have
fees too. The official was especially struck by one worker’s story of her
restaurant’s switch from checks to payroll cards: the checks were delivered
by oft-delayed trucks that, living paycheck-to-paycheck, sometimes left her
family in dire financial straits, while the cards were loaded electronically,
like clockwork. 215 Ultimately the Attorney General pushed for a bill that
allowed the cards if employees opted–in, but also prohibited nearly all
fees. 216
Finally, an almost associational multiplier effect can be observed in a
much–discussed workshop on the federal U–Visa program, which can
provide legal status to undocumented victims of serious crimes who assist
law enforcement. 217 As a former IDOL official admitted, workplace lawyers
can be reticent to delve deeply into notoriously complex immigration law,
and visas were not an issue of interest in the agency at the time. 218 But
worker centers’ mostly immigrant membership cared deeply about
residency rules, and one leader began shopping the idea of a workshop to
close contacts at a variety of agencies. 219 When a critical mass agreed, the
event, which included the IDOL, federal DOL, NLRB, and other agencies,
was on. 220 An IDOL official recalled the workshop as a turning point in
attorneys’ openness to confronting immigration issues in their work. By the
end of the day, a cross–agency consensus emerged on how U–Visa
questions and facts arising from investigations should be handled,
highlighted by the creation of a “point person” at every agency to assure
confidentiality and policy uniformity. 221 The momentum carried over to a
panel discussion at DePaul University, where the law school’s legal clinic
later compiled a summary of administrative best practices 222 and published

213.

Interview with Ill. Att’y Gen. Officer, in Chi., Ill. (Feb. 2, 2017).
Id.
215. Id.
216. Cancino, supra note 212. See also 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 115/14.5 (2018).
217. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., Victims of Criminal Activity: U Nonimmigrant Status,
https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/victims-human-trafficking-other-crimes/victims-criminal-activityu-nonimmigrant-status/victims-criminal-activity-u-nonimmigrant-status (last visited Aug. 2, 2018).
218. Interview with Ill. Dep’t of Labor Officer, in Chi., Ill. (Apr. 1, 2017).
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id. An advocate from the CWC noted that the EEOC, in particular, has since done an
impressive job processing U-Visas. Interview with Chi. Workers’ Collaborative Staffer, in Chi., Ill.
(June 2, 2017).
222. ASYLUM & IMMIGRATION LAW CLINIC AT DEPAUL UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF LAW, THE UVISA: A NONIMMIGRANT STATUS FOR CRIME VICTIMS, https://law.depaul.edu/academics/experiential214.

454

BERKELEY JOURNAL OF EMPLOYMENT & LABOR LAW

Vol. 39:2

a study highlighting discrepancies in U–Visa certification rates depending
on where in Illinois the underlying crime was committed. 223
In these and other instances, interpersonal ties can be viewed as
catalyzing or adding special value to a one–off project. But they probably
also serve a connective function, gluing participants together where it might
feel easier to go at it alone. Hints of this are apparent in the ways that even
people who support working together implied that agency staff and
advocates are not a natural fit. Agencies, for example, pushed back against
any perception that collaboration entailed diminished control over their
agendas. “We develop our own strategies and priorities,” was one of the
more direct responses to a query about the influence of outside groups.224
An EEOC official suggested that groups were sometimes naïve in assuming
that agencies could simply pivot from an on–going task to another without
added resources or revision to a statutory mandate. 225 Most staffers can’t
“pick and choose” their work, said another. 226
This line of tension came to a head during a large meeting in early
2016 between four worker centers and five federal agencies on the potential
for coordinated investigations, where a government representative described
the two sides as embodying competing agendas: power and organizing
versus law enforcement. 227 Though the official had hoped to underscore the
importance of nurturing trust that had been developing between the parties,
at least one advocate was offended and a second jumped–in to suggest that
“debriefing” was needed after cases settled so that each side could learn
more about the others’ motives and constraints. 228
The friction played out concretely in negotiations between worker
centers and the IDOL over the 2016 Illinois Domestic Workers’ Bill of
Rights Act. 229 Long an advocate priority and backed by rising national
momentum, by 2015 it became clear that a bill adding home, child, and

learning/legal-clinics/clinics/asylum-immigration/confia/Documents/3.%20The%20U%20Visa%20A%20Nonimmigrant%20Status%20for%20Crime%20Victims%20(English).pdf.
223. See GERALDINE ARRUELA ET AL., DEPAUL UNIVERSITY ASYLUM & IMMIGRATION LAW
CLINIC, UNEQUAL PROTECTION: DISPARATE TREATMENT OF IMMIGRANT CRIME VICTIMS IN COOK, THE
COLLAR COUNTIES & BEYOND (2015), https://law.depaul.edu/about/news/Documents/unequalprotection—-disparate-treatment-of-immigrant-crime-victims-in-cook-the-collar-counties-and-beyondpdf.pdf.
224. Interview with Ill. Att’y Gen. Officer, in Chi., Ill. (Feb. 2, 2017). A DOL official signaled an
openness to strategic suggestions from outside groups before noting that the agency won’t always “act
the way they want.” Interview with U.S. Dep’t of Labor Officers, in Chi., Ill. (July 19, 2017).
225. Field notes from César F. Rosado Marzán (June 23, 2016) (on file with author).
226. Interview with Ill. Att’y Gen. Officer, in Chi., Ill. (Feb. 2, 2017).
227. Field notes from César F. Rosado Marzán (June 23, 2016) (on file with author).
228. Id. Interview with Chi. Workers’ Collaborative Staffer, in Chi., Ill. (June 2, 2017).
229. Alexia Elejalde-Ruiz, Rauner Signs Law Extending Labor Protections to Domestic Workers,
CHI. TRIB. (Aug. 15, 2016, 3:32 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-rauner-signsdomestic-workers-bill-0816-biz-20160815-story.html.
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elder care workers to the state’s basic labor protections could pass, but only
without new funding. 230 IDOL urged caution, fearing a paper tiger of new
rights that the already strapped agency would not be able to adequately
enforce. 231 That domestic workers are cloistered in private residences and
isolated from each other heightened anxiety that absent additional officers
and outreach the law would be, as an IDOL official stated, “setting us up
for failure.” 232 The groups saw things differently. From their perspective,
rights badly enforced are still rights. And any right, an ARISE worker
center leader explained, offers a “pressure point” for activism. 233 Protests,
demand letters, and petitions, in other words, can bring even paper tigers to
life. 234
Ultimately, the bill passed without either side fully understanding the
other’s position. 235 Yet, the key players moved on—an official depicted the
episode like a rift that was forgiven but not forgotten—and other
collaborative efforts carried on. 236
Sometimes, though, the mismatch is more basic and the breach
becomes permanent. For all the excitement generated by Chicago’s recent
minimum wage enhancements, the city’s worker centers have effectively
given up on the existing enforcement entity, the BACP. 237 That is in great
part because BACP was not originally set up to enforce employment law.
Instead, BACP has long been the place where entrepreneurs head for
licenses and consumers go for fraud. 238 When the city “dumped” three new
employment laws—but not new staff—onto its portfolio in 2015, the results
were as bad as one, according to the former BACP Commissioner herself,
might have predicted: “[W]e had a bit of a learning curve . . . as we don’t
deal with labor issues as it is.” 239 From ARISE’s perspective, it shouldn’t. 240

230.

Interview with Ill. Dep’t of Labor Officer, in Chi., Ill. (Apr. 1, 2017).
Id.
232. Id. Early discussions also included in-home space and food provisions that officials thought
would be impossible to police even with more money. Id.
233. See Interview with Arise Chi. Staffer, in Chi., Ill. (Mar. 3, 2017).
234. Id.
235. Interview with Ill. Dep’t of Labor Officer, in Chi., Ill. (Apr. 1, 2017).
236. Id.
237. See Justin Miller, Chicago Activists and Aldermen Call for New Office to Enforce Labor
THESE
TIMES
(Feb.
28,
2017,
4:25
PM),
Laws,
IN
http://inthesetimes.com/working/entry/19932/chicago_activists_and_aldermen_call_for_new_office_to_
enforce_labor_laws (calling for a replacement agency); Interview with Arise Chi. Staffer, in Chi., Ill.
(Mar. 3, 2017).
238. John Byrne, Emanuel to Rely on Worker Complaints to Enforce Higher Minimum Wage, CHI.
TRIB. (June 10, 2015, 4:35 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/politics/ct-chicagominimum-wage-increase-enforcement-met-0611-20150610-story.html.
239. Id. See also Melissa Sanchez, Chicago’s Lax Enforcement of Minimum Wage Hike Leaves
Workers in the Lurch, CHI. REP. (Feb. 8, 2017), https://www.chicagoreporter.com/chicagos-laxenforcement-of-minimum-wage-hike-leaves-workers-in-the-lurch/ (“[T]he city department responsible
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The worker center and allied groups have since called for transferring
BACP’s enforcement responsibilities to a newly created employment law–
specific agency, a Chicago Office of Labor Standards. 241 “Enforcing
employment laws is not [BACP’s] job,” explained an ARISE leader, “but
with the new office we want to make it someone’s job.” 242
In sum, these sorts of “one–off” stories grow out of and thematically
draw upon the “coffee and calls” by continuing to highlight the
importance—and difficulty—of kindling and maintaining relationships in
service to workers’ rights in Chicago. Even for isolated projects, parties are
difficult to get together and to keep together, as all kinds of
misunderstandings, conflicting purposes, and agendas can enter the picture.
All of it, though, can be fixed through relationships, which remain the
prime engine of up–and–down and side–to–side collaborations.
C. On the Regular
Of course, sometimes people just really like working together. In those
special instances, collaboration can become regularized. For many officials,
this is an express goal, at least in select settings. The state Attorney
General’s office, for instance, sits high atop a 17–story atrium in the
polarizing Thompson Center, a massive postmodern mix of glitter and
Jetson–alia 243 that, home to many elected and appointed officials, also
employs layers of security simply to monitor the elevator. The overall effect
is, as an IL AG representative stated, “not . . . welcoming,” and the
attorneys want to be in routine contact with outsiders to shepherd the
uninitiated through their doors. 244 “Have us on your Bat Phone,” she tells
advocates. 245 A federal DOL official, similarly, stressed that the agency’s
mandate required that officers have their “head’s up” when groups make
noise about an employer or an industry. 246 Workers get scared silent, but
their advocates don’t, so “we can’t sit back” and wait for individual
complaints, he said. 247 OSHA actually uses the number of trainings

for enforcement has investigated just a quarter of 454 wage complaints, recovered lost pay for only a
few dozen people and has yet to fine a single company for violating the ordinance.”).
240. Interview with Arise Chi. Staffer, in Chi., Ill. (Mar. 3, 2017).
241. Miller, supra note 237.
242. Interview with Arise Chi. Staffer, in Chi., Ill. (Mar. 3, 2017).
243. See Blair Kamin, Thompson Center Sale Shouldn’t Automatically Mean Demolition, CHI.
TRIB. (June 4, 2017), https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/columnists/ct-thompson-center-kamin-met0602-2-20170602-column.html (describing the James R. Thompson Center as a “spaceship-shaped
glitter palace”).
244. Interview with Ill. Att’y Gen. Officer, in Chi., Ill. (Feb. 2, 2017).
245. Id.
246. Interview with U.S. Dep’t of Labor Officers, in Chi., Ill. (July 19, 2017).
247. Id.
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conducted with outside groups as an informal metric for year–to–year
outreach. 248
Regularization can also develop between agencies. The IDOL and IL
AG “borrow[]” staff in both directions. 249 “Literally one person can make a
difference,” stressed a former state official before conceding that it can be a
“balancing act” when it was time for her office to reciprocate.250 Those sorts
of collaborations, too, can be relationally contingent. Where the jurisdiction
fits, the IDOL can refer wage and hour cases to the federal DOL, and early
in a former IDOL official’s tenure the feds encouraged just that, hoping to
increase the caseload of a number of newly hired bilingual officers. 251
Beyond the resource assistance, the arrangement helped state officials get to
know their federal partners on a personal level, and, over time, two officers
became favorites for their aggressive enforcement approach. 252 Eventually,
a senior state official called his federal counterpart, and the two hashed out
a system for funneling state referrals to those specific officers going
forward. 253
Where a good relationship exists, routine collaborations can form even
from below. In 2011, Carlos Centeno, a temporary worker assigned to a
factory in southwest Chicago, was scalded to death while cleaning a 500–
gallon chemical tank. 254 Though burned over 80% of his body, management
didn’t call 911 and filled out paperwork before having a co–worker drive
him to a local clinic instead of a hospital.255 The events galvanized CWC
and its temp–heavy membership to create the “No More Deaths” campaign,
a flourishing advocate–OSHA partnership. 256 Initially CWC simply asked
for health and safety trainings to help newly–branded “Peer Educators” spot
and share safety issues with coworkers. 257 The organizing impact of just that
first step inspired the workers to turn some of the examples into narratives
that were eventually recounted face–to–face up the agency ladder, from line
officers, to the Regional Director, to Dr. David Michaels, the Assistant
Secretary of Labor at the time. 258 After several meetings, in 2013 Michaels

248.

Interview with OSHA Experts, in Chi., Ill. (June 14, 2017).
Interview with Ill. Dep’t of Labor Officer, in Chi., Ill. (Apr. 1, 2017).
250. Id.
251. Id. See also Interview with U.S. Dep’t of Labor Officers, in Chi., Ill. (July 19, 2017).
252. Interview with Ill. Dep’t of Labor Officer, in Chi., Ill. (Apr. 1, 2017).
253. Id.
254. Jim Morris, They Were Not Thinking of Him as a Human Being, CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY
(Dec. 20, 2012), https://www.publicintegrity.org/2012/12/20/11925/they-were-not-thinking-him-humanbeing.
255. Id.
256. Interview with Chi. Workers’ Collaborative Staffer, in Chi., Ill. (June 2, 2017).
257. Id.
258. Id.
249.
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spearheaded OSHA’s formalized Temporary Worker Initiative. 259 Today,
CWC’s Peer Educators are equipped with OSHA certification cards earned
after ten course hours at the University of Illinois–Chicago School of Public
Health, meet periodically with the agency’s Labor Liaison, and are in the
room with OSHA’s district director when colleagues file complaints in–
person. 260
The best repeat collaboration examples meld the bottom–up with the
side–to–side. A powerful example is the “Chicago–Area Interagency
Workers’ Rights Roundtable,” which convenes three to four times a year to
bring a large cross–section of city, state, and federal agency officials and
consulates together with over twenty community, legal, and advocacy
organizations. 261 Though in some ways tied to an earlier venture that
stretches back to 2000, the current Roundtable began in 2013, rotates
agency hosts, and is designed to help all parties coordinate outreach,
procedures, and enforcement. 262
In the advocacy community, a high–ranking federal official is
perceived as the leader behind the initiative.263 He is certainly the glue. “He
says let’s do it, and people follow the lead,” said one advocate. 264 “I can
even just call him on his cell,” said another. 265 When explaining how his
organization developed such loyalty to the local agency, a CWC staffer
replied, “He called us.” 266
The official’s commitment to the roundtable format may be rooted in
seeing it succeed at a previous position in a different part of the country. 267
Critical to its effectiveness in Chicago, though, is the inclusivity his
leadership cultivates. For a 2016 Roundtable the official invited local
worker centers to help set the agenda, and the event transformed into an
agency–to–agency/advocate–to–agency workshop centered on small and
large group discussion of multi–jurisdictional enforcement fact patterns
written by the centers but loosely based on real cases. 268 The idea was to
bring bureaucracy to life in a way that allowed every stakeholder to share a

259. Id. See also Press Release, OSHA, OSHA Launches Initiative to Protect Temporary Workers
(Apr. 29, 2013), https://www.osha.gov/news/newsreleases/national/04292013.
260. Interview with Chi. Workers’ Collaborative Staffer, in Chi., Ill. (June 2, 2017).
261. Field notes from César F. Rosado Marzán (June 22, 2016) (on file with author). See also
Interview with U.S. Dep’t of Labor Officers, in Chi., Ill. (July 19, 2017); Interview with Raise the Floor
All. Staffer, in Chi., Ill. (Feb. 14, 2017).
262. Field notes from César F. Rosado Marzán (June 22, 2016) (on file with author).
263. Interview with Raise the Floor All. Staffer, in Chi., Ill. (Feb. 14, 2017).
264. Id.
265. Interview with Arise Chi. Staffer, in Chi., Ill. (Mar. 3, 2017).
266. Interview with Chi. Workers’ Collaborative Staffer, in Chi., Ill. (June 2, 2017).
267. Interview with NLRB Officer, in Chi., Ill. (Feb. 9, 2017).
268. Interview with Raise the Floor All. Staffer, in Chi., Ill. (Feb. 14, 2017).
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vision for collaboration up, down, and side–to–side. 269 For ROC–Chicago
that meant, first, offering a dose of reality: “You all don’t talk to each
other!” a leader described thinking in the meeting’s lead–up. 270 But, he
added, the agencies won’t change unless they “know the flaws up front,”
and worker centers were in a good position to convey them if the agencies
would listen. 271
Basing the discussion in stylized, yet very real, worker experiences
seemed to be the right mix of narrative detachment and hard truths that
improved collaboration (and preserved relations) going forward. 272
Reflecting back, the ROC–Chicago leader called the meeting a “dawning
moment” for the agencies. 273 A Raise the Floor official who helped write
the hypos labeled the exercise a “pivot point” that generated a sort of cross–
border empathy: 274 agencies saw that worker centers’ have expertise to
offer, and the centers learned why interagency work that seems intuitive
may not be—but that a little encouragement helps.275
Currently, Roundtable participants are trying to revive the idea of a
universal complaint form that could be filed with one agency, cite
overlapping legal violations, and then get passed around to the
jurisdictionally–appropriate officers. 276 The attempt itself is fundamentally
hopeful, suggesting that everybody—or, at least, everybody who meets
regularly—is focused on collaborative enforcement. In individualized
settings, DOL officials expressed pride in a bound book of inter–agency
contacts that never leaves the intake desk so that anyone on duty can call
the right jurisdictional official and make an immediate referral.277 Finishing
the job means making sure the worker knows precisely why the DOL can’t
help, who can, and then connecting them personally. 278 OSHA, similarly,
has a “One–Door” philosophy where if someone with, for example, a
discrimination claim stops by, the agency is already prepared with an
EEOC referral, navigational support, and a commitment to follow–up. 279
But the factor that points most strongly to enduring ties may be the
readiness of groups and agencies to keep experimenting with collaboration.

269.

Id.
Interview with Rest. Opportunities Ctr. Chi. Staffer, in Chi., Ill. (July 21, 2017).
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Interview with Raise the Floor All. Staffer, in Chi., Ill. (Feb. 14, 2017).
275. Id.
276. Field notes from César F. Rosado Marzán (June 22, 2016) (on file with author); Interview
with U.S. Dep’t of Labor Officers, in Chi., Ill. (July 19, 2017).
277. Interview with U.S. Dep’t of Labor Officers, in Chi., Ill. (July 19, 2017).
278. Id.
279. Field notes from César F. Rosado Marzán (June 22, 2016) (on file with author).
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Agencies liked to describe advocates as their “eyes and ears.” 280 Advocates
were willing to accept the role, 281 but for the arrangement to really work,
some flexibility is required. That might mean hiring summer interns at the
agency to collate and map a sudden inundation of jpegs when the CWC sets
about photographing temp agencies that refuse to register with the state. 282
It could also mean securing an unmarked car with tinted windows and a
camera to catch vans stopping at currency exchanges to extract illegal fees
from day laborers for rides to anonymous factories. 283 As a federal official
noted, any workplace violation, from losing money that’s earmarked for
rent to losing a job completely, can be dire. 284 In that moment, multiple calls
to multiple agencies that lead more to frustration than assistance, can break
someone. 285 Good collaboration means a long–term commitment—no
matter the facts and sometimes on the fly—to figuring out how to avoid
even the first fruitless contact. 286 But it is the willingness to experiment that
gives the commitment long-term life.
D. Sparks of Formalization: The Many Faces of Chicago MOUs
As discussed in Part III, agencies sometimes try to actively move
beyond casual collaboration through the use of MOUs, a self–regulating,
“soft law” attempt to formalize interagency dealings.
In Chicago, we identified agreements that structured three types of
interagency activities: (1) the referral of workers to other agencies, (2) the
sharing of information between agencies, which sometimes includes
training staffers across agencies, and (3) the facilitation of joint
investigations. Some agencies also use MOUs to foster relationships with
international consulates, which then serve as intermediaries with foreign
workers and employers in the U.S.
If a through–line across the diversity of agreements emerged, it was a
sense that, while a malleable catalyst for interagency case referrals,
knowledge diffusion, and even friendly conversations, Chicago MOUs tend
to be vague, pop-up only intermittently, and exist as an uncertain
foundation for deep and sustained collaboration. Put differently, MOUs are
really “soft” law.

280. Id.; Interview with Ill. Att’y Gen. Officer, in Chi., Ill. (Feb. 2, 2017); Interview with U.S.
Dep’t of Labor Officers, in Chi., Ill. (July 19, 2017).
281. Interview with Rest. Opportunities Ctr. Chi. Staffer, in Chi., Ill. (July 21, 2017).
282. Interview with Chi. Workers’ Collaborative Staffer, in Chi., Ill. (June 2, 2017).
283. Id.
284. Interview with NLRB Officer, in Chi., Ill. (Feb. 9, 2017).
285. Id.
286. See id.
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1. At the Creation: Ad Hoc and Pragmatic
We found Chicago MOUs to be essentially ad hoc creations.287 Most of
the agreements began as creatures of pragmatism justified, at least in part,
by broader government policies to conserve resources and increase
efficiency in regulatory areas where there are overlapping functions or too
few resources to perform even ministerial duties. 288 At times, an MOU
drafted at an agency’s D.C. headquarters is simply transposed by the
agency’s regional officers in Chicago. 289 Even there, however, local
implementation of the agreements is not automatic. Sometimes a motivated
agency official will implement the “cold calls and coffee” tactic previously
discussed to spark local inter–agency buy-in. 290 In those cases, behind what
may seem like template language can be important leadership initiatives by
key officials who take their jobs and enforcement mandates seriously.
Enterprising officials also report using MOUs to concretize already–
existing collaborative practices and promote institutional continuity. One
agency head reported doing just that to protect collaborations where an
interagency partner retires, is replaced, or moves elsewhere. 291 “It’s harder
to dispose of paper than a person,” he suggested. 292
2. Referrals
The simplest MOUs we encountered encouraged case referrals where
another agency appeared to also have jurisdiction over a worker’s claim. An
OSHA–NLRB Memorandum created in 2014 is representative, stating that
that if an officer believes that a complaint touches on a violation policed by
the other agency, the official should inform the worker and direct them to
the relevant website to file another complaint.293 That policy supplements a
slightly earlier and more specific agreement that directed OSHA agents

287.

See, e.g., Interview with NLRB Officer, in Chi., Ill. (Feb. 9, 2017).
See, e.g., id. Some agencies memorialize specific procedures for collaboration in MOUs. The
Illinois Department of Employment Security (IDES), which handles unemployment claims, has
agreements addressing how it should interact with federal agencies when the latter requests information
possessed by IDES regarding certain employers and employees. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/1706 (2018).
However, state law also protects information it collects from employees and employees. See 405/1900;
405/1900.1. As such, unlike many other agencies, IDES provides detailed information to the public on
the types of entities that may request certain IDES investigatory data. ILL. DEP’T OF EMP’T SEC., IDES
Shared Data Agreements, http://www.ides.illinois.gov/Pages/Shared-Data-Agreements.aspx (last visited
July 15, 2017).
289. Interview with NLRB Officer, in Chi., Ill. (Feb. 9, 2017).
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293. Anne Purcell, National Labor Relations Board Memorandum OM 14-77, Procedure in Cases
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encountering untimely retaliation claims to inform workers that an NLRB
unfair labor practice charge might still be available. 294
A commonality in these sorts of referral MOUs is a striking lack of
substance, which seems to limit the assistance provided to employees. The
first iteration of the OSHA–NLRB MOU came with “talking points briefly
describing the NLRB and providing [NLRB] contact information for use in
telephone or in–person conversations with complainants with untimely
whistleblower claims [under OSHA].” 295 But nothing else. The official is
not, for example, encouraged to show the worker a sample NLRB charge,
recommend a known counterpart at the other agency, or even email the
appropriate website link. While the MOUs seemingly ensure that officials
will not remain silent in the face of a viable alternative legal claim, the
actual collaboration it facilitates is surface–level, at best. 296
3. Information Sharing and Cross–Training
Not every MOU is so limited. Some give better instructions for
information sharing and actually require officials to affirmatively interact
294. William Donovan & Lafe Solomon, National Labor Relations Board Memorandum OM 1460, Referring Untimely 11(c) Complainants to the NLRB (May 21, 2014).
295. Id.
296. An interesting variation on the OSHA-NLRB MOU is an agreement between the Illinois
Department of Labor and the federal Department of Labor. U.S. Dep’t of Labor & Ill. Dep’t of Labor,
Partnership Agreement Between the U.S. Department of Labor, Wage and Hour Division and the Illinois
Department of Labor (2011) [hereinafter Illinois & U.S. DOL MOU]. In our interviews, federal officers
emphasized that where state law was better for workers than federal law, they would push to have the
case taken up by the state agency. Illinois’s Employee Classification Act, for example, provides for
stronger remedies where workers are wrongly classified as independent contractors.
The Act states that an individual who performs work for a contractor in Illinois will be considered
an employee of the putative employer unless the putative employer can prove that:
(1) the individual has been and will continue to be free from control or direction over the
performance of the service for the contractor, both under the individual’s contract of service
and in fact; (2) the service performed by the individual is outside the usual course of services
performed by the contractor; and (3) the individual is engaged in an independently established
trade, occupation, profession or business; or (4) the individual is deemed a legitimate sole
proprietor or partnership under subsection (c) of [the law].
820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 185/1(b) (2018).
Employers who misclassify employees risk sanctions of up to $1,000 per employee, per day
misclassified, if the violation is found by the Illinois Department of Labor in a first audit. The penalty
may increase to twice that amount, or $2,000 per day, per employee misclassified if found in a second
audit. See 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 185/40(a) (2018).
The U.S. Department of Labor’s Wage and Hour Division (WHD) also refers workers to the IDOL
where an employer is too small to be covered by the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). Interview with
Wage & Hour Div., U.S. Dep’t of Labor Experts, in Chi., Ill. (July 19, 2017). The FLSA applies to all
employers and individuals engaged in interstate commerce (among others). See 29 C.F.R. § 783.18.
Enterprises that make more than $500,000 in yearly revenues will also be covered by the FLSA even if
they are not directly involved in interstate commerce. 29 U.S.C. § 203(s)(1)(A)(ii). Illinois minimum
wage law, however, applies to all Illinois employers who employ more than two employees in a calendar
year. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 105/3(c) (2018). Illinois law, therefore, is broader and potentially covers
more wage and hour violations.
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with other agencies. 297 An MOU signed by the NLRB and the City of
Chicago Commission on Human Relations, for example, provides for the
transfer of files where either agency requests it in writing, describes the
claim before it, and lists the assigned attorney. 298 Common in such MOUs is
an acknowledgement of independent limits on information sharing.
Requests that the NLRB share affidavits, documents, or notes, for instance,
must comply with the agency’s own rules on evidence sharing. 299 The
Chicago Commission on Human Relations will divulge information only as
allowed by the Illinois Freedom of Information Act, 300 the Illinois Local
Records Act, 301 and other applicable laws. 302 Importantly, the MOU
emphasizes that neither party’s authority can be diminished by the
document, 303 a provision that could serve to artificially block some
initiatives, as collaboration itself arguably diverts agencies from path
dependent activities to partnerships likely to be focused on some other type
of project, draining resources in the process. 304 Some information sharing
MOUs also include provisions for cross–institution trainings on each
agency’s operations and animating legal principles, which perhaps have the
salutary effect of increasing inter–agency affinities and thus the likelihood
of future interactions. 305
While short and sometimes vague, the mere existence of an
information sharing MOU may give officers the confidence needed to pick
up the phone and make a connection. A piece of paper providing assurance
that transmitting information between agencies is not just authorized but
encouraged may increase the level of collaboration overall, certainly

297. See, e.g., EEOC and Dep’t of Justice Office of Special Counsel for Immigration Related
Unfair Emp’t Practices, Memorandum of Understanding Between The Equal Employment Opportunity
Comm’n and The Office of Special Counsel for Immigration Related Unfair Employment Practices (last
modified July 6, 2000); NLRB & U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Occupational Safety and Health Admin.,
Memorandum of Understanding Between the NLRB and OSHA (2017); U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Wage &
Hour Div. & EEOC, Memorandum of Understanding Between the U.S. Department of Labor, Wage and
Hour Division and the U.S. EEOC (2017) [hereinafter MOU between the U.S. DOL, WHD and the U.S.
EEOC].
298. NLRB & City of Chi. Comm’n on Human Relations, Memorandum of Understanding
Between Region 13 of the NLRB and the City of Chicago Comm’n on Human Relations 2 (2014)
[hereinafter NLRB–Chicago CHR Memo].
299. Id. See also 29 C.F.R. § 102.118 (providing for strict limits on when NLRB officers may
provide testimony and other evidence).
300. NLRB–Chicago CHR Memo, supra note 298.
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. Id. at 3.
304. Cf. Freeman & Rossi, supra note 86, at 1181–82 (suggesting that “up-front investments” in
agency collaborations “might be substantial” relative to “a baseline of agencies deciding policy matters
independently”).
305. NLRB–Chicago CHR Memo, supra note 298, at 3; MOU between the U.S. DOL, WHD and
the U.S. EEOC, supra note 297, at ¶ C.
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relative to documents that merely instruct officers to tell workers to go talk
to someone else. That effect could be limited, however, by the other internal
agency rules on confidentiality that give officers the impression that their
true authority to share information is less than what is suggested in an
agreement.
4. Joint Investigations
A particularly fervent hope expressed by advocates during our research
was for city, state, or federal agencies to plan coordinated enforcement
“raids” on notoriously bad employment sectors or companies. 306 One
worker center representative stressed how an inordinate amount of the
group’s work centered on a row of ethnic restaurants on a single Chicago
street. Each week seemed to bring a new wage, hour, discrimination, labor
organizing, or health and safety complaint to the intake desk. 307 A one–day
blitz by multiple enforcement agencies, he thought, was in order. 308 The
wish has not materialized.
Indeed, while sketching out the contours of something like a joint or
multi–party investigation would seem to be a good subject for an MOU, our
interviews revealed only a few relevant documents. The most prominent
was an MOU between the DOL and EEOC spearheaded by David Weil, the
head of the Department of Labor’s Wage and Hour Division under the
Obama Administration. 309 In it, the agencies agreed to coordinate
investigations where it appeared employers were violating the laws of each
agency. 310 But President Trump has since named new DOL officials and the
eventual fate of the MOU is unknown. The U.S. DOL also has an
agreement with its Illinois counterpart that calls for information sharing,
quarterly meetings, and, finally, joint investigations. 311 The federal officials
we interviewed, however, described the MOU as primarily a vehicle for
data diffusion and did not offer examples of coordinated investigations. 312
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Field notes from César F. Rosado Marzán (Feb. 23, 2016) (on file with author).
Interview with Arise Chi. Staffer, in Chi., Ill. (Mar. 3, 2017).
308. An example of the effectiveness of multi-enforcement efforts is the 2013–2014 California
Labor Enforcement Task Force, which combined the Division of Labor Standards Enforcement, the
Employment Development Department, and the California Occupational Safety and Health
Administration, which discovered that 40% of the 216 businesses inspected had violated laws enforced
by all three of the agencies. GLEESON, supra note 83, at 132.
309. See MOU between the U.S. DOL, WHD and the U.S. EEOC, supra note 297.
310. Id. at ¶ C.
311. Illinois & U.S. DOL MOU, supra note 296, at 1–2.
312. Interview with Wage & Hour Div., U.S. Dep’t of Labor Experts, in Chi., Ill. (July 19, 2017).
307.
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5. The Special Case of Consular MOUs
In some ways the most intriguing MOUs in Chicago are not inter–
agency but between agencies and foreign government consulates, which
have become important transnational advocacy organizations for nationals
living abroad. 313 The offices bridge language and trust divides, particularly
for undocumented workers who may, with increasing justification, fear
contact with any U.S. federal or state government institution. 314 In Chicago,
the Mexican consulate stands out as uniquely proactive, as it has instituted a
“Labor Window” (Ventanilla Laboral) system of actually accepting,
processing, and then transferring workers’ legal claims to the right domestic
agency. 315 Mexican consulate officials are even willing to serve as formal
interlocutors during this process. 316
Federal wage and hour officials were especially enthusiastic about this
relationship, noting that an MOU signed with the Mexican government
made the consulate one of the agency’s most effective intermediaries with
respect to getting money into workers’ hands following a successful
judgment. 317 The NLRB and OSHA have similar documents. 318 Under the
NLRB’s agreement, the agency stresses its interest in educating not just
workers and employers, but also consular officials, who are viewed as
critical conduits of labor rights information to Mexican nationals living in
Chicago. 319 Indeed, consular offices are a favored location for legal
workshops organized by agency officials in Chicago 320 and beyond. 321

313.

See, e.g., GLEESON, supra note 83, at 164.
Id. See also Liz Robbins, A Game of Cat and Mouse With High Stakes: Deportation, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 3, 2017) (describing “judges, defense lawyers and clients” on “high alert . . . watching to
see if immigration enforcement officers, many in plain clothes, are in a courthouse”).
315. Xóchitl Bada & Shannon Gleeson, A New Approach to Migrant Labor Rights Enforcement:
The Crisis of Undocumented Worker Abuse and Mexican Consular Advocacy in the United States, 40
LAB. STUD. J. 32, 44–45 (2014).
316. Id.
317. Interview with Wage & Hour Div., U.S. Dep’t of Labor Experts, in Chi., Ill. (July 19, 2017).
318. NLRB & Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the United Mexican States, Letter of Agreement
Between the Office of The General Counsel of the NLRB and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the
United Mexican States (2013), https://www.nlrb.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/basic-page/node4573/loa_-_english_-_signed%20Mexico_0.pdf; NLRB, Region 13 & Consulate General of Mexico,
Agreement Establishing an understanding between the Chicago Regional Office (Region 13) of the
NLRB and the Consulate General of Mexico in Chicago, Illinois (on file with authors); OSHA &
Consulate General Of Mexico in Chi., Ill., Arrangement Establishing an Alliance Between the U.S.
Department of Labor’s Occupational Safety and Health Administration, Illinois and Wisconsin Area
Offices
and
the
Consulate General
of
Mexico
in
Chicago,
Illinois
(2010),
https://www.osha.gov/dcsp/alliances/regional/reg5/mexico_il_final.html.
319. NLRB, Region 13 and Consulate General of Mexico, supra note 318, at *2–3.
320. Interview with OSHA Experts, in Chi., Ill. (June 14, 2017).
321. GLEESON, supra note 82, at 173, 177 (noting the role of Mexican consular offices in San Jose
and Houston); See also Bada & Gleeson, supra note 315, at 44–45.
314.
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6. Lingering Skepticism
Not every agency official valued MOUs as a collaborative device.322
Skeptics underscored that many investigative files have confidential
information that should never be disclosed, MOU or not. 323 In fact, the
MOUs we found generally included targeted confidentiality protections,
even where the agreement envisioned joint investigations of the identical
employer. 324 At the same time, officials who advocated for more
meaningful interagency interactions suggested that confidentiality concerns
were sometimes invoked reflexively or unnecessarily overemphasized. 325
We also heard at least one officer suggest that where an institutional
incentive conflicts with a collaborative goal expressed in an MOU, the
incentive is sure to win out. 326 Officials may have to meet case resolution
quotas, for example, pressure that is likely to crowd out an admonition
contained in a three–year old agreement to spend time referring cases to
other agencies. 327 Rarely do agency budgets include a line item for
interagency activities. 328
And, of course, as non–binding agreements, MOUs are as powerful as
the leaders willing to spend time reminding people to follow them. As
noted, the end of David Weil’s time as the DOL Wage and Hour Division
head may also spell the end of the DOL–EEOC memorandum.
E. Tripartite Chicago? Behind the Paid Sick Leave Ordinance of 2016
The passage of legislation can sometimes be viewed as a product of a
matured collaborative culture. Where groups and agencies work together to
identify a legal gap, and the legislative branch runs with it, some
combination of coffees, one–offs, regularized contacts, and agreements may
have coalesced to help create something new. Chicago itself has been a
hotbed for innovative employment law enhancements in recent years. 329 To
322.

Field notes from César F. Rosado Marzán (Feb. 23, 2016) (on file with author).
Id; Interview with Ill. Att’y Gen. Officer, in Chi., Ill. (Feb. 2, 2017).
324. MOU between the U.S. DOL, WHD and the U.S. EEOC, supra note 297, at ¶ E. See also Ill.
Dep’t of Labor & U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Wage & Hour Div., Amendment No 1. To Partnership
Agreement Between The U.S. Department Of Labor, Wage And Hour Division And Illinois Department
Of Labor (2014), https://www.dol.gov/whd/workers/MOU/il_1.pdf (last accessed Aug. 2, 2018).
325. Interview with Ill. Att’y Gen. Officer, in Chi., Ill. (Feb. 2, 2017).
326. Field notes from César F. Rosado Marzán (Feb. 23, 2016) (on file with author); see also
Interview with NLRB officer, in Chi., Ill. (Feb. 9, 2017).
327. Interview with NLRB officer, in Chi., Ill. (Feb. 9, 2017).
328. Id.
329. In 2014, Chicago upped the local minimum wage far beyond the federal level. See Hal
Dardick et al., City Council Raises Chicago Minimum Wage to $13 by 2019, CHI. TRIB. (Dec. 2, 2014,
7:30 PM) https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/politics/chi-chicago-minimum-wage-increase-1320141202-story.html). In 2013 and 2015, the city and its encompassing county, Cook County, enacted
ordinances specifically to deter and punish wage theft. See Kevin Solari, Why the New Law Combating
Wage Theft in Chicago’s Cook County is a Big Deal, IN THESE TIMES (Feb. 17, 2015, 12:22 PM),
323.
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examine some of the collaborative threads behind these new laws, we
zeroed in on the 2016 passage of the Earned Sick Leave Ordinance, for two
reasons. First, relative to minimum wage laws, paid sick leave regulations
are less well-known and somewhat novel, on the books in just 8 states and
29 cities. 330 Second, Chicago’s ordinance has attracted scholarly attention as
an exemplar of the shift toward tripartite relationships and social bargaining
in the United States. 331
But as we learned, while labor and management did indeed take part in
a structured, city–initiated, and formalized negotiation process, the largest
and most powerful employer groups ultimately opposed the bill. Advocates
themselves surmised that the other prominent business leaders and
moderate politicians who stayed on the sidelines did so for public relations
reasons, not because they were mollified by or even neutral about the
process or outcome. In other words, the true cogs responsible for the
ordinance’s enactment were the usual suspects—unions, worker centers,
liberal–progressive groups, and Democratic politicians—packaged together
with business on an ad hoc task force for political expedience. Ultimately,
these long established political relationships of ideologically consistent
allies appeared to matter more than any genuinely collaborative, tripartite
alignment.
1. The Ordinance
The earned sick days ordinance provides every private sector employee
who works over eighty hours for a Chicago employer in a 120–day period
the right to accrue paid sick time. 332 Covered employees can accrue one
hour of paid sick leave for every forty hours worked for one employer,
capped at forty hours per year. 333 Employees may carry over up to twenty
hours of unused paid sick time to the next calendar year, 334 and employers
who violate the law are liable for up to three times the amount of denied
time off, along with attorneys’ fees and other legal costs. 335 In all, the
ordinance covers around 400,000 employees in Chicago. 336
http://inthesetimes.com/working/entry/17648/workers_advocates_celebrate_new_chicago_law_that_cou
ld_punish_businesses_wh.
330. Paid Sick Time Legislative Successes, A BETTER BALANCE (May 21, 2018),
http://www.abetterbalance.org/resources/paid-sick-time-legislative-successes/.
331. Andrias, supra note 3, at 65–67.
332. See Chi., Ill. Ordinance 2016-2678. There are various exceptions covering certain kinds of
employers and employees.
333. See id. at 1-24-045(b)(2-4).
334. See id. at 1-24-045(b)(5).
335. See id. at 1-24-110.
336. See
WORKING
FAMILIES
TASK
FORCE,
FINAL
REPORT
5–9
(2016),
https://www.cityofchicago.org/content/dam/city/depts/mayor/Press%20Room/Press%20Releases/2016/
April/Working-Families-Task-Force-Final-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/BE2X-ZQFT].
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Stark, on–the–ground inequalities appeared to justify the legislative
effort. 337 Studies had revealed that, in general, only workers on the city’s
highest salary rungs had access to paid time off for illnesses. 338 This created
significant challenges for low–wage workers already struggling to balance
family and work obligations in the best of health. 339 As the Working
Families Task Force report examining the issue concluded, the lack of
access to paid time off for illness in Chicago led to physical, emotional, and
economic problems for employees and definitive public health risks for
residents. 340 Not only were the economic costs of sick leave slight in
comparison, data suggested that there were actually economic gains to be
made by the policy. 341
2. Enactment
A group calling itself the Chicago Earned Sick Time Coalition led the
legislative march toward the new city policy. 342 Its constituents were
unsurprising and included two worker centers, the Restaurant Opportunities
Center of Chicago, and Arise Chicago, 343 two policy groups, Women
Employed and the Shriver Center, 344 and a prominent labor union, the
United Food and Commercial Workers (UFCW) Union Local 881. 345 The
effort was also backed by labor–friendly Democratic aldermen, including
Toni Foulkes, a former supermarket employee and UFCW Local 881
member, and Ameya Pawar, an alderman who had frequently supported
Arise Chicago’s campaigns in the past. 346
337.

See id.
Id. at 10–11.
339. See id.
340. See id. at 7, 19; See also Chi., Ill. Ordinance 2016-2678 at 1.
341. See WORKING FAMILIES TASK FORCE, supra note 336, at 10–17.
342. Interview with Arise Chi. Staffer, in Chi., Ill. (Apr. 5, 2016); E-mail from Arise Chi. staffer to
author (Dec. 22, 2016) (on file with author).
343. Id.
344. Id.
345. Officially, the Chicago Earned Sick Time coalition had dozens of members. See PAID SICK
TIME CHICAGO, http://sicktimechicago.org/about-2/ (last visited in July 23, 2017). However, in his field
research, the author observed only a handful of organizations that were actually active in the campaign,
rather than passive supporters. Those organizations are the ones listed herein. Interview with Arise Chi.
Staffer, in Chi., Ill. (Apr. 26, 2016). Interview with Chi. Fed’n of Labor Staffer, in Chi., Ill. (June 12,
2017). Interview with Rest. Opportunities Ctr. Chi. Staffer, in Chi., Ill. (July 22, 2017). Coalition
partners stated that UFWC was the most important member of the coalition, perhaps because of its
resources and political ties. Interview with Chi. Fed’n of Labor Staffer, in Chi., Ill. (June 12, 2017).
Interview with Rest. Opportunities Ctr. Chi. Staffer, in Chi., Ill. (July 22, 2017).
346. See Fran Spielman, Council Says Most City Businesses Must Provide 5 Sick Days a Year,
CHI. SUN-TIMES (June 22, 2016), http://chicago.suntimes.com/news/council-says-most-city-businessesmust-provide-5-sick-days-a-year; Alexia Elejalde-Ruiz, Proposed Ordinance Would Mandate Five Paid
(Apr.
13, 2016, 4:52
PM),
Sick
Days a
Year in Chicago, CHI. TRIB.
http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-paid-sick-leave-ordinance-0414-biz-20160413-story.html.
On Ameya Pawar’s relationship with Arise Chicago see, e.g., Adam Kader, Arise Chicago Leads
338.
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Though the coalition suspected that the election of rising mayoral star
Bill de Blasio, who made sick leave a key campaign plank in New York
City, might spark Chicago mayor Rahm Emmanuel’s competitive instincts
and soften any hesitancy toward employee–protective legislation, 347 the
Coalition could not persuade City Hall to push a bill absent a wider—and
more balanced—pool of proponents. 348 So instead, and against the wishes of
coalition members who thought the research was already clear, the Mayor
convened a stakeholder group to study the issue. 349 The group became
known as the Working Families Task Force. 350
The Task Force included moderate public officials and business
representatives, 351 and fully assembled it boasted 26 members spanning
labor, management, and the city government. 352 Importantly, large employer
representatives were on board, including the Chicagoland Chamber of
Commerce, the Illinois Restaurant Association, and the Illinois Retail
Merchants Association. 353 Other businesses, large and small, were also
present: Rush University Medical Center and the supermarket chain
Roundy’s (known as “Mariano’s” in Chicago) on the big side, 354 and Honey
Butter Fried Chicken (a restaurant), 7Wire Ventures (a venture fund), and
S&C Electric (a manufacturer of equipment and services for electric power
systems) on the other end. 355
While the Task Force’s make–up provided a patina of collaborative
tripartism, there is a counter–narrative. The big employer representatives,
namely the Chicagoland Chamber of Commerce and the Illinois Retail
Merchants Association, came out against the measure, warning of increased
operating costs. 356 One labor activist suspected that the equally massive
Illinois Restaurant Association and food industry–friendly aldermen
remained neutral because of how effectively the coalition had framed the

Campaign to Pass Anti-Wage Theft Ordinance, DIGNITY AT WORK (Jan. 24, 2013),
https://dignityatwork.wordpress.com/2013/01/24/arise-chicago-behind-chicagos-anti-wage-theftcampaign/ (last visited July 19, 2017).
347. Interview with Arise Chi. Staffer, in Chi., Ill. (Mar. 3, 2017).
348. At least one member of the Chicago Earned Sick Time Coalition, ROC Chicago, emphasized
the need to seek stakeholder input and participation in the ordinance, something that ROC Chicago, as
an industry-specific worker center, attempts to do as part of its overall strategy. Interview with Rest.
Opportunities Ctr. Chi. Staffer, in Chi., Ill. (July 21, 2017).
349. Interview with Arise Chi. Staffer, in Chi., Ill. (Mar. 3, 2017).
350. Interview with Arise Chi. Staffer, in Chi., Ill. (Apr. 5, 2016).
351. Id.
352. See WORKING FAMILIES TASK FORCE, supra note 336, at 4.
353. Id.
354. Id.
355. Id.
356. Hal Dardick, City Council Approves 5 Paid Sick Days, CHI. TRIB. (June 23, 2016),
http://digitaledition.chicagotribune.com/tribune/article_popover.aspx?guid=d12d0286-783d-4392-98f0d6719bc89806.
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issue: the dangers of infected food. 357 An ARISE staffer felt that the
message had so thoroughly invaded public consciousness that open
opposition risked a perception of being “in favor of sick chefs and
servers.” 358 The Chamber of Commerce and Retail Association, he thought,
ended up looking “out of touch.” 359
The fact that important employer groups rejected the measure, and that
others may have self–censored for public relations reasons, suggests that
credit for the ordinance’s enactment goes less to the Task Force and more to
the work of those most interested in paid sick leave at the outset: like–
minded progressive groups and politicians. 360 In hindsight, the Task Force
might most credibly be viewed as legislative cover for passage of a bill the
liberal coalition wanted all along. While some of the smaller businesses
involved, especially Honey Butter Fried Chicken, openly pressed for
passage, ROC–Chicago, a key coalition and Task Force member, had
cultivated the restaurant as a “high–road” partner long before the campaign
began. 361
That is not to say that the corporate members of the Task Force had no
impact. In the eyes of the Chicago Federation of Labor (itself a member),
employer participation helped modify the ordinance’s language to be more
palatable to business, which further diminished political opposition and
perhaps the likelihood of later court challenges. 362 But it is also true that
ordinance’s commitment to near–universal coverage—including oft–
excluded groups like nannies, day laborers, in–home care assistants, and
employees without co–workers—make the end result a liberal landmark. 363
So while one could argue that the law’s legislative narrative represents
a move toward tripartism, this is only true in a limited sense. A more
standard story of activism, partisan alignments, and public framing in a big,
blue American city may be more accurate. As an ARISE staffer rather
plainly implied: We won.364

357.

Interview with Arise Chi. Staffer, in Chi., Ill. (Mar. 3, 2017).
Id.
359. Id.
360. On the history of community activism and City Hall ties in Chicago, see, e.g., PIERRE
CLAVEL, ACTIVISTS IN CITY HALL: THE PROGRESSIVE RESPONSE TO THE REAGAN ERA IN BOSTON AND
CHICAGO (2010).
361. Interview with Rest. Opportunities Ctr. Chi. Staffer, in Chi., Ill. (July 21, 2017).
362. Interview with Chi. Fed’n of Labor Staffer, in Chi., Ill. (June 12, 2017).
363. Elizabeth J. Kennedy & Michael B. Runnels, Bringing New Governance Home: The Need for
Regulation in the Domestic Workplace, 81 UMKC L. REV. 899, 901 (2013) (“[T]he twentieth-century
employment law paradigm has left many low-wage workers in a ‘representation gap,’ unable to improve
their own working conditions or enjoy the protection of universal and enforceable labor standards.”).
364. Interview with Arise Chi. Staffer, in Chi., Ill. (Mar. 3, 2017).
358.
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IV. DISCUSSION: NODAL AGENTS AND A RELATIONAL—BUT NOT “NEW”—
LABOR LAW
What picture materializes from our accounts of relationships that start
as coffees or a call and may grow into discreet or regularized projects,
MOUs, or sometimes laws that extend new rights to workers? First, the
good news. Even in our decentralized 365 administrative system—one that
scholars expressly contrast with European models that retain a durable
semblance of corporatism—the Chicago story suggests that effective
collaboration, both up–and–down and side–to–side, exists. In our city, key
workplace enforcement officials are not all administrative islands knotted to
narrow mandates and clinging to Weberian “office secrets.” If anything, our
study exposed the nuts–and–bolts, insider work of some public servants we
call “nodal agents” 366 for their powerfully connective and centripetal
relational practices. The NLRB officer who arrived in Chicago and made
calls and coffee his first order of business is a prime example. His meetings
resonated throughout our interviews and made an express mark in the
community through participation in the Interagency Workers’ Rights
Roundtable, and an implicit mark by building up advocates’ faith in the
administrative state. The IL AG’s Workplace Rights Bureau officer who
wants advocates to treat her office line like a “Bat Phone” is another nodal
agent. Civil society actors, including labor activists, worker center leaders,
Democratic politicians, and others who coalesce and actively reach out to
administrators are nodes in their own right.
Whether springing from a devotion to good government, justice, or a
job well done, this sort of personal commitment to collaboration fuels
critical interactive processes among agency officers and between agency
officers and civil society. The effect can be strong enough that at times a
personal commitment to collaboration seems to work better than a mandate.
At the NLRB, for example, advocates had a “paper” right to attend witness
interviews, but it took a state nodal agent to meet with worker centers, look
into their concern that not all agents followed the procedure, and honor the
concern by clarifying the rule inside the agency.
Sometimes the commitment involves a willingness to accept that
activists can add real value to the administrative process. No regulation
teaches that certain advocacy groups closely vet allegations for meritorious
charges, document evidence, keep track of witnesses, and generally help
officers do their jobs better. Figuring that out takes routine advocate
365.

See Marisam, supra note 91, at 193–94.
“Nodal agent” is a play on Vivek Chibber’s use of the term “nodal agency,” here adapted and
applied to public officials instead of public institutions. See supra note 72, at 20. Characteristics of nodal
agents can be seen in Chris Ansell’s and Alison Gash’s study finding that collaborative governance
requires “facilitative leadership,” “face–to–face dialogue,” “trust building,” and a “commitment to the
process.” Ansell & Gash, supra note 123, at 554–59. Our nodal agents exhibited these traits.
366.
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interactions and an acceptance that the “experts” do not have a monopoly
on expertise. 367 Today payroll cards—fair payroll cards—exist because the
AG’s Workplace Rights Bureau office let a fast food worker tell her story
and took it seriously.
Nodal agents, moreover, don’t hoard power or jurisdiction. Shared
investigations make for good law enforcement, as various Chinese buffets
and their labor suppliers found out, courtesy of the AG’s Workplace Rights
Bureau and the Illinois Department of Labor. Temp agencies and their
clients may soon learn this too, thanks to a federal OSHA officer with the
humility to suggest that the Chicago Workers’ Collaborative experiment
with a state law protection against retaliation.
For nodal agents, MOUs can be more than memorialized aspirations.
They are also a device to recruit, reinforce, and construct new
relationships—a sort of bureaucratic collaborative manifesto in the absence
of regulation. Legally, MOUs don’t require information sharing, but their
existence may be a reminder that a phone call is worth the time. Legally,
MOUs can’t mandate revival of a time–barred claim with cross–agency
charge, but they can encourage the conversation and ease it with talking
points. And MOUs can turn an exploited, undocumented worker’s trip to
the Mexican consulate into a “window” of U.S. labor and employment
enforcement options, complete with personalized help in making contact
with the DOL, EEOC, AG, or any other agency.
In short, and in our most optimistic form, we found the inklings of
something that might be thought of as, if not a “new labor law,” a heavily
relational labor law where officials and worker advocates look for any
hook—background, biography, or business matter—to work together to
better enforce or expand openings for new law.
The discovery of an interagency model that proceeds hydraulically,
that is, wherever relationships allow collaborations to proceed, is not
necessarily a new discovery. As noted, administrative law scholars have
talked about “informal” dealings for a long time. Here we have simply
confirmed its dominance in Chicago and, through our interviews, provided
some unique detail. Nevertheless, this finding should be a fundamentally
hopeful one for labor advocates across the country. Where participants are
willing to take the time, the sorts of relationships that pave the way for
partnerships could arise in any city or, really, any public administrative
setting.
But the good news has limits. If nodal agents are the glue that binds a
relational labor law, it is more of the Elmer’s than Super variety. This is

367. See Fine & Gordon, supra note 60, at 575–76 (finding that “worker centers and unions have
access to information about sectors that are otherwise hard for the government to penetrate, knowledge
about industry structures, and the capacity to reach workers and document complicated cases”).
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because a bureaucratic ethic of coffees, workshops, roundtables, and task
forces, even with employer involvement, is profoundly contingent on the
interests of people not mandated to do any of it. It is also contingent on
their availability. Collaboration may dissipate when a nodal actor moves,
retires, or is forced out for political reasons. So, while the NLRB official of
such connective importance to the Chicago story is a careerist with civil
service protection and a more or less permanent feature of the inter–agency
and inter–advocate landscape, the opposite was true at the IDOL, where a
gubernatorial election brought collaborative upheaval. There, the nodal
agent was temporary, and when the agent left, the relational circuit shorted.
Similarly, in hindsight, the sick leave Task Force turned out to be a political
triumph, but it also surfaced hardened opposition that might have won the
day under a different Mayor. New City Hall leadership could also endanger
the implementation and enforcement of the law further down the line.
Thus, not all nodes are created equal. We suggest there are permanent
nodal agents, or “perm nodes,” and there are temporary nodal agents, or
“temp nodes.” Temp nodes can underlie a collaborative network of
effective labor and employment rights enforcement, but that network is
inherently precarious. A temporary node is, obviously, better than nothing,
but permanent nodes are more stable and, therefore, superior.
That is not to say perm nodes do not face challenges. Even the best of
the best may not get their calls returned. Moreover, permanence may not
always be good for collaboration. Some advocates complained of
“deadwood” at various agencies, uncooperative civil servants ensconced in
their offices. These “perm islets,” as we call them, can become a persistent
barrier. 368
Table 2 diagrams these basic principles in practice on two axes.
Horizontally, it queries if the actor in question shares commitments to
collaborate or not. Vertically, it asks if the actor is a permanent or
temporary civil servant, e.g., if the official is protected by civil service laws
or is vulnerable to political changes. Hence, the first quadrant denotes
“perm nodes,” or actors with commitments to collaborate who are also
permanently embedded in the bureaucracy and in the labor and employment
rights network through civil service protection. Below them, in quadrant
three, are “temp nodes.” Like “perm nodes” these actors are committed
synergies with other agencies and with civil society actors, but their jobs are
politically vulnerable. Next to quadrant one, in quadrant two, are “perm
islets,” officials who have little to no interest in working with other
agencies or with advocates but, impervious to political change, may become
stable obstacles to collaboration. Finally, in quadrant four, are the “temp
368. Recognizing this reality, Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi have suggested adding legal heft to
MOUs to better guarantee that agencies do not shirk duties in times of transition. See Freeman & Rossi,
supra note 86, at 1188.
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islets.” These actors lack collaborative commitments, but because their
posts are politically or contractually dependent, the impediment may be
temporary.
Table 2: Types of Collaborative State Agents
Collaborative commitments

Civil service protections

YES

NO

YES

1. PERM NODES

2. PERM ISLETS

NO

3. TEMP NODES

4. TEMP ISLETS

The table underscores that rights of way, but also potholes, mark the
path of a relational labor law. If a coordinated, multi–agency investigation
of a notorious local employer is on a group’s agenda, getting it done
quickly may require a phalanx of quadrant 1 state actors, the administrative
law equivalent of a winning BINGO card. Likewise, a motivated civil
servant may be on the cusp of winning support for a cross–agency training
and file sharing agreement, but someone less interested, a quadrant 4 islet,
may unexpectedly replace her negotiating partner.
These sorts of problem scenarios play out all the time in Chicago.
Advocates are currently pushing a universal complaint form that,
conspicuously, used to actually exist. Arise Chicago was a prime mover
behind all of the recent workplace legislative victories in the city, but now
that it has experienced the BACP’s scattered investigative responsibilities in
action, it wants a new agency dedicated to employment law. Turnover at the
IDOL changed its advocacy relationships profoundly.
That is not to say that a relational labor law cannot work or even that it
cannot often work. Where activists seek a cabined, short–term victory, an
assemblage of quadrants 1 and 3 nodal agents, permanent and temporary,
may suffice. Indeed, as we found, sometimes different quadrants mesh
effectively. Perhaps there is a perm islet somewhere inside the Mexican
Consulate, but, if so, there seem to be enough perm nodes or rotating temp
nodes around to overcome it. From every angle, but especially from the
Department of Labor’s vantage, the Consulate’s Ventanilla Laboral system
is a collaborative success story. So too are worker centers’ efforts to
persuade the IDOL, federal DOL, and NLRB to coordinate U–Visa
processing, even in the face of initial disinterest. And if we take the
Chicago Workers’ Collaborative at its word, with the right approach any
official can be organized, an ethic perhaps exemplified by its innovative
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“No More Deaths” partnership with OSHA where workers are quasi–
deputized as health and safety inspectors and coordinate with the agency.
As these and other quadrant permutations suggest, in a sense the table
can be thought of as a version of Shannon Gleeson’s “political field”
theory, only here the expansion and enforcement of labor rights depends
less on precise political alignments and more on collaborative commitments
and job protections.
V. CONCLUSION AND NEXT STEPS
Our research has tried to map and understand how collaboration, both
up–and–down and side–to–side, operates in Chicago. In doing so, we hoped
to both identify tripartite-like arrangements and investigate the continued
emergence of the “new labor law” in a big, “Blue” American city. As
inequality rises, and as traditional forms of labor and employment
protections remain weak or even become less effective, 369 the domestic and
international track record of tripartism—broadly defined—suggests the
project is important.
While the stark lack of formal tripartite institutions in the United States
would indicate that positive conclusions should be hard to come by, we end
our work with some optimism. In an important respect, we found informal
activity aiming to organize the otherwise fragmented American state, at
least in Chicago. While the labor and labor relations literature generally
discusses labor organizing and, more recently, organizing employers into
arrangements suited for multi–employer bargaining schemes, here we
discovered an interesting twist: the work of “organizing” the state. The
organizational activity we identify proceeds interpersonally, goes both “up–
and–down” and “side–to–side,” and is characterized by various
conflagrations of nodes and islets and perm and temp tenures that make its
effectiveness vary by times and places.
Throughout, we have argued in favor of all types of collaboration for
better, more effective enforcement of labor and employment rights.
Detractors, including some agency officials themselves, may object and
point to partnerships that have already been tried and failed. Collaboration,
it can also be argued, wastes the limited time and resources of overstretched
agencies. As so-called “nodes” busy themselves with coffees, calls, and
conferences, cases accumulate, forcing workers to wait longer for their
rightful wages, for resolution of health and safety grievances, or for

369. As Politico recently investigated, six states do not employ wage investigators and twenty-six
have fewer than ten. Marianne Levine, Behind the Minimum Wage Fight, A Sweeping Failure to Enforce
(Feb.
18,
2018,
10:40
AM
EST),
the
Law,
POLITICO
https://www.politico.com/story/2018/02/18/minimum-wage-not-enforced-investigation-409644. In some
states, legislative takeovers lead to the shuttering of enforcement agencies altogether. Id.
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investigation of ongoing discrimination. Overeager nodes might even
carelessly transmit private claimant information across agencies. Hence, the
story may go, nodes are idealistic blunderers at best and unethical, perhaps
law-breaking, agents at worst.
We would disagree. It is true that certain collaborative initiatives have
failed, like the universal complaint form that some are trying to restart
today in Chicago. But evidence from other cities, and from Chicago itself,
prove that collaborative projects can produce great results. It is also true
that, when done well, collaboration helps agencies pool resources, which
can conserve time, staff, and money. And while some claimant information
may need to be kept private, the level of protection required can be
determined case-by-case. Genuinely confidential information can be
shielded and, in those cases, collaboration should indeed be limited. But
just because some information needs to be withheld sometimes does not
mean that collaboration is suspect in all cases.
Short of formalizing a complete system of up–and–down and side–to–
side governance, the best way to improve, clarify, and ultimately maximize
collaboration may be through tripartite boards or labor unions strong
enough to force all parties to the table. 370 We support those options, but
wish to consider a nearer–term solution based more directly on our
findings: new laws that stabilize or enhance relationships. 371 This is because
the moral of our stories seems to be the importance of undergirding
collaborative intent with legal structures. Even the most gifted collaborators
we spoke with, for example, did not want more partnerships—they wanted
more law. Arise Chicago does not want workshops with the city’s current
and jurisdictionally–scattered workplace officers, it wants a new and
dedicated agency to enforce local labor and employment protections full
time. The former IDOL official, who we identified as a temp node, agreed
with advocates that domestic workers urgently needed new rights, but she
also could not see an innovative way that the agency could effectively
implement a bill that contained a zero–dollar enforcement budget. She
370. Michael Wachter, for example, explains that U.S. labor unions were able to expand and
effectively bargain collectively on behalf of workers in the corporatist contexts created by the New Deal,
which enfranchised private bargaining through law. However, post-World War II, U.S. policy returned
to favoring individual over collective actors, such as corporate shareholders. Other policies, such as the
deregulation of heavily unionized industries and antitrust doctrines that limited the capacity of corporate
actors to act in concert to set prices and output quotas, also severely debilitated American corporatism.
Wachter, supra note 42, at 588–90, 628. Corporatism is thus not simply an attitude or orientation. It is
structured by formal institutions, including law. See also Rogers, supra note 42, at 1624–25, 1637,
1640–41 (proposing a model of “libertarian corporatism” for contemporary U.S. society where law and
public institutions would play a fundamental role, providing individuals and labor unions specific
rights).
371. Cf. DUKES, supra note 6, at 4–5 (arguing that even the most assertive twentieth century
European corporatist thinkers, such as Hugo Sinzheimer, recognized the importance of law and the state
to democratize the economy by providing labor rights).
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wanted a different law with funds attached to maintain the agency’s good
relationship with the groups. And an NLRB official we laud as a
quintessential permanent node made clear that what is needed is not more
chit–chat but some kind of stable interagency liaison to institutionalize what
he puts into daily practice—because he knows his relational efforts are not
enough.
Out of these and other stories, here we advocate specifically for more
relationally–stabilizing law in the form of enhanced civil service
protections, as well as mandates or incentives for collaboration generally.
Influential public administration and administrative law scholars have been
calling for American expansion of professional bureaucracy given that our
civil servant corps has remained in a numeric slump for decades. 372 Career,
professional bureaucrats have been largely replaced by private contractors
who lack the skills and experience for the complex tasks of government.
They also lack vocation for public service. While we value the contributions
of civil society to regulate the workplace, government should better
formalize relational labor law to foment more effective and transparent
partnerships and to protect the nodal agents that emerge.
We also suggest that new, mostly local labor rights agencies, such as
the one being advanced in Chicago or currently existing in San Francisco,
be “nodally” structured. A fundamental agency aim of the new labor law
should be to collaborate formally and informally with other city, state, and
federal institutions, including the sharing of resources to better enforce
existing law. A true nodal agency would be empowered and expected to
carry out targeted, joint, multi-jurisdictional inspections while pooling
information to aid in the enforcement of other unrelated laws in the process.
Ideally it would also receive reciprocal support from other local, state, and
federal agencies, some perhaps with more and better resources.
Further research should thus focus on the regulatory architecture best
suited to these micro (agent) and macro (agency) relational goals. How
might law best build collaborative interpersonal and interagency
commitments? Positive incentives like monetary awards, benefit grants, or
even ceremonial honors may be one possibility. Proactive collaborative
mandates or the installation of local, state, or federal czars charged with
fostering administrative coherence may be another. A key question is
whether there are ways to draw the employer community into the mix. Our
research suggests that absent some sort of affirmative command or clear

372. PAUL R. VERKUIL, VALUING BUREAUCRACY: THE CASE FOR PROFESSIONAL GOVERNMENT
(2017); JOHN J. DIIULIO JR., BRING BACK THE BUREAUCRATS: WHY MORE FEDERAL WORKERS WILL
LEAD TO BETTER (AND SMALLER!) GOVERNMENT (2014).
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economic benefit employers may not be interested in partnerships. If a
tripartite, new labor law is to flourish, employers need to be included. 373
We also need to know how nodal agents should be identified for some
sort of tenure protection. Performance reviews that include commentary
from colleagues at other agencies or groups is one possibility. Perhaps all
officials at a certain level of bureaucracy should be shielded from political
turnover, or maybe only those with access to information most amenable to
joint projects or investigations, like investigative files. There may be a
danger, of course, that turnover constraints would also entrench islets.
Whether a permanent islet can transform over time to take on a more
collaborative posture is unclear, but the best advocates will surely leverage
their organizing prowess to find out. Research that will answer these sorts
of questions awaits.
Finally, skeptics of a relational labor law might argue that while statesociety collaboration might be effective in liberal cites like Chicago, the
opposite effects might be found in politically conservative locations. In
Chicago the DOL might work with the Mexican consulate and worker
centers to combat wage theft, but in Tucson the collaboration might be
between DOL and ICE, and the result may be deportations and the
tarnishing of an important worker protective agency. We accept this critique
but see it as further evidence of the need for legal prompts and guardrails. If
the state is to be organized both coherently and in ways that better
safeguards workers’ rights, we need more and clear law delimiting which
agencies collaborate, and for what kinds of programs and goals. Otherwise,
the law will blow according to the relational winds, which are variable,
unstable, and often stormy.
In all, below the formally decentralized, even incoherent American
administrative state, far away from its more corporatist European
counterparts and the New York wage board experience, lies an unofficial
organizational reality that deserves more attention. Renewed focus on the
informal life of agencies is needed not only to better understand the
American administrative experience, but to nurture its positive aspects and
perhaps even formalize them for a stronger relational labor law. In the
meantime, it is likely that nodal agents, both in and outside of government,
will be leading the charge for collaboration–enhancing reforms. Whatever
their official titles, these actors are organizers in every sense of the term.
373. Critics of a collaborative tripartism where business shares regulatory roles with labor and the
state may be concerned that employers will seek to thwart every initiative that will expand workers’
rights. Perhaps such skepticism is correct. But obstruction is not inevitable. International and even
American historical examples of collaborative, effective tripartism—some cited in this article—abound,
and the International Labour Organization has consistently heralded tripartism as the key operating
orientation for effective worker rights. See Tripartite Constituents, INT’L LABOUR ORG. (2018),
http://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/who-we-are/tripartite-constituents/lang—en/index.htm
(last
visited Aug. 3, 2018).
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And as scholars continue to probe and question the possible emergence of a
new labor law, these agents will be busy—amid variable politics and
despite obstacles like islets—pulling disparate people together, one
relationship at a time.
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